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GPS TRACKING OUT OF
FOURTH AMENDMENT DEAD ENDS:
UNITED STATES V. JONES AND

THE KATZ CONUNDRUM*
FABIO ARCILA, JR.*
United States v. Jones, which reviewed the Fourth Amendment
constitutionality of warrantless GPS tracking, may be the most
important Fourth Amendment opinion since the Supreme Court
decided Katz v. United States over four decades ago. Though
Katz has dominated Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, it
introduced significant ambiguities, such as the conundrum
concerning whether search analysis turns upon privacy
expectations or spatial distinctions rooted in property and
trespass. Jones was a highly anticipated decision because it was
widely understood that it might have ramificationsfor numerous
core Fourth Amendment doctrines, including the Katz
conundrum, and in turn for many governmental activities either
currently or potentially subject to the Fourth Amendment.
Examples include routine criminal law enforcement
investigations, technological surveillance for either criminal or
civil purposes (through GPS but also other means, such as
location tracking capabilities embedded in individuals' cellular
telephones), and national security, to name a few.
The attention devoted to Jones by the legal community and
public at large was fully merited. Surprisingly, the Supreme
Court ruled unanimously that the GPS tracking at issue was
subject to Fourth Amendment protections. More substantively,
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however, the decision resulted in three separate opinions
applying vastly different rationales. This Article explains the
Jones decision; situates it within the broader framework of
constitutionalsearch and seizure law; analyzes and critiques the
various opinions; and explores the many varied, significant
implications that Jones either will or may have for the future of
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. It makes two overarching
points. First, Jones is much more important for the reasoning
that the various Justices employed than it is for its technically
narrow holding. Second, though Jones either resolves, or
suggests answers to, important questions that Katz raised, in
doing so Jones itself raises significant issues for future
consideration.
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INTRODUCTION

In United States v. Jones,' the Supreme Court recently responded
to law enforcement's aggressive use of surreptitious, prolonged, and
warrantless global positioning system ("GPS") tracking, a practice
which had led to proliferating judicial references to dystopia2 and
George Orwell's 1984.1 Federal circuit courts had initially found no
Fourth Amendment problem with this governmental activity,4 though
1. 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012).
2. See, e.g., United States v. Cuevas-Perez, 640 F.3d 272, 276 (7th Cir. 2011)
(referring to GPS tracking as "a technology surely capable of abuses fit for a dystopian
novel"), vacated, 132 S. Ct. 1534 (2012); id. at 286 (Wood, J., dissenting) (describing "the
government's ability constantly to monitor a person's movements, on and off the public
streets, for an open-ended period of time" and opining that such systems "make the [one]
that George Orwell depicted in his famous novel, 1984, seem clumsy and easily avoidable
by comparison"); United States v. Pineda-Moreno, 617 F.3d 1120, 1121 (9th Cir. 2010)
(Kozinski, C.J., dissenting from the denial of rehearing en banc) ("1984 may have come a
bit later than predicted, but it's here at last."); id. at 1126 ("There is something creepy and
un-American about such clandestine and underhanded behavior. To those of us who have
lived under a totalitarian regime, there is an eerie feeling of ddjh vu."). Technological
advances have also resulted in similar references in slightly different contexts. See, e.g., In
re Application of the U.S. Authorizing the Release of Historical Cell-Site Info., 809 F.
Supp. 2d 113, 127 (E.D.N.Y. 2011) (writing, in response to the government's demand for
cell-site-location data for a period of at least 113 days, that "[w]hile the government's
monitoring of our thoughts may be the archetypical Orwellian intrusion, the government's
surveillance of our movements over a considerable time period through new technologies,
such as the collection of cell-site-location records, without the protections of the Fourth
Amendment, puts our country far closer to Oceania than our Constitution permits."). 1984
was also referenced several times during the Supreme Court oral argument in Jones. See
Transcript of Oral Argument at 13, 25, 27, 33, 35, 57, United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945
(2012) (No. 10-1259), http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral-arguments/argument-transcripts
/10-1259.pdf [hereinafter Jones Transcript].
3. GEORGE ORWELL, 1984 (1949).
4. Several federal circuits had upheld the warrantless installation of a GPS device
against a Fourth Amendment seizure challenge. See, e.g., United States v. Hernandez, 647
F.3d 216, 220 n.4 (5th Cir. 2011); Cuevas-Perez, 640 F.3d at 274 n.2, 275-76; United States
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state courts had largely been resistant, either on Fourth Amendment
or state constitutional grounds.' The Supreme Court entered the fray
through Jones after the District of Columbia Circuit created a federal
circuit split on the issue.' This was the Court's second opportunity in
the last few years to reconsider the Fourth Amendment in light of
rapidly advancing technological developments, and to provide bolder
and more meaningful guidance about the future of constitutional
search and seizure jurisprudence.'

v. Garcia, 474 F.3d 994, 996 (7th Cir. 2007); United States v. Mclver, 186 F.3d 1119, 112627 (9th Cir. 1999) (finding no seizure absent deprivation of "dominion and control" over
the vehicle or "damage to the electronic components of the vehicle"). One circuit had
rejected an argument that installationof a GPS device constituted an illegal search under
the Fourth Amendment. See Mclver, 186 F.3d at 1126-27. Numerous federal circuits had
ruled that monitoring of these GPS devices did not constitute a Fourth Amendment
search. See, e.g., Hernandez, 647 F.3d at 220 n.4; Cuevas-Perez, 640 F.3d at 275-76; United
States v. Marquez, 605 F.3d 604, 609-10 (8th Cir. 2010); United States v. Pineda-Moreno,
591 F.3d 1212,1216-17 (9th Cir. 2010).
5. See Commonwealth v. Connolly, 913 N.E.2d 356, 369-70 (Mass. 2009) (ruling that
warrantless GPS installation was a seizure under the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights,
article 14); People v. Weaver, 909 N.E.2d 1195, 1195-96 (N.Y. 2009) (holding that the
warrantless GPS tracking of a van's position for sixty-five days constituted an illegal
search under the New York Constitution, article I, section 12); State v. Jackson, 76 P.3d
217, 222, 224 (Wash. 2003) (en banc) (ruling that "use of a GPS device on a private vehicle
involves a search and seizure" under the Washington State Constitution, article I, section
7, which "focuses on those privacy interests which citizens of this state have held, and
should be entitled to hold, safe from governmental trespass" (internal quotation marks
omitted)). But see Foltz v. Commonwealth, 698 S.E.2d 281, 285-93 (Va. Ct. App. 2010)
(rejecting Fourth Amendment search and seizure claims), aff'd on reh'g en banc, 706
S.E.2d 914 (Va. Ct. App. 2011); State v. Sveum, 2009 WI App. 81, 1 1-2, 319 Wisc. 2d
498, 769 N.W.2d 53, 56 (rejecting Fourth Amendment challenge to police search that used
GPS device to monitor car's movement), aff'd, 2010 WI 92, 328 Wisc. 2d 369, 787 N.W.2d
317. Since the Jones decision, and as of August 2012, two more state courts have ruled
against warrantless GPS tracking. See State v. Adams, 725 S.E.2d 523, 527 (S.C. Ct. App.
2012) (finding that the installation of a tracking device on a vehicle constituted a search
under Jones); State v. Zahn, 2012 SD 19, 9I 18-19, 812 N.W.2d 490, 495-96 (invoking the
Fourth Amendment to invalidate twenty-six days of warrantless GPS tracking, relying
upon both Justice Scalia's majority opinion in Jones as well as Justice Alito's concurring
opinion, which are summarized below at notes 57-66 and accompanying text).
6. See United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544 (D.C. Cir. 2010), cert. granted sub
nom. United States v. Jones, 131 S. Ct. 3064 (2011).
7. The first opportunity was City of Ontario,Cal. v. Quon (Quon II), 130 S. Ct. 2619
(2010), which involved governmental monitoring of text messages on city-owned pagers
issued to SWAT team members. Id. at 2625-26; see also Quon v. Arch Wireless Operating
Co. (Quon 1), 445 F. Supp. 2d 1116, 1124 (C.D. Cal. 2006) (referring to "city-owned
pagers"), rev'd, Quon II, 130 S. Ct. 2619 (2010). In Quon II, the Court ruled narrowly,
holding that the searches complied with the Fourth Amendment's reasonableness
requirement. 130 S. Ct. at 2632-33. The Court emphasized that it had taken a cautious
approach:
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Jones did not disappoint: it has the potential to be the Supreme
Court's most important Fourth Amendment decision since it decided

Katz v. United States' over four decades ago. Katz, which famously
embraced a privacy model of the Fourth Amendment rather than the
previously controlling property model,' has dominated the search and
seizure landscape since it was decided. But Katz's move to privacy has
led to uncertainties and raised significant critiques that its privacy
model extends insufficient protections against governmental searches.
Jones offered the Supreme Court the opportunity to address this
Katz conundrum. Jones produced three different opinions, each with
the potential to dramatically change the course of constitutional
search and seizure law. The competing rationales are crucially
important because they will influence Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence generally, as well as Fourth Amendment surveillance
jurisprudence specifically, including as applied to numerous existing,
developing, and future technologies. Thus, Jones is vastly more

important for the various Justices' reasoning than for its technically
narrow holding.
Jones is a significant decision in part because much more was at
stake than whether Fourth Amendment protections extend to the
approximately 3,000 warrantless GPS monitoring devices that the
federal government has used annually. 0 A primary concern was, and
Though the case touches issues of farreaching significance, the Court concludes it
can be resolved by settled principles determining when a search is reasonable.
The judiciary risks error by elaborating too fully on the Fourth
Amendment implications of emerging technology before its role in society has
become clear... .Prudence counsels caution before the facts in the instant case are
used to establish far-reaching premises that define the existence, and extent, of
privacy expectations enjoyed by employees when using employer-provided
communication devices.
Id. at 2624-29 (citations omitted).
8. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
9. See id at 351 (holding the "Fourth Amendment protects people, not places" and
"[w]hat a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a
subject of Fourth Amendment protection").
10. See Jones Transcript, supra note 2, at 60 (responding to Justice Sotomayor's
question of whether the United States had "any idea of how many GPS devices are being
used by Federal Government agencies and State law enforcement officials," the United
States responded: "The Federal Government, I can speak to, and it's in the low thousands
annually"); Julia Angwin, FBI Turns Off Thousands of GPS Devices After Supreme Court
Ruling, WALL ST. J. BLOG (Feb. 25, 2012, 3:36 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/digits
(covering
/2012/02/25/fbi-turns-off-thousands-of-gps-devices-after-supreme-court-ruling/
the Big Brother in the 21st Century symposium held at the University of San Francisco
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remains, the third-party doctrine, under which exposure of
information to third parties, even in instances where there is little
alternative, can obviate any privacy interest and thus eliminate
Fourth Amendment protections." Among existing (and likely also
future) technologies, a great uncertainty exists as to whether the
third-party doctrine will allow governments to compel production of
user data-including location data-from third-party service
providers without a warrant.12 Technologies subject to the doctrine's
reach include GPS devices installed in vehicles by either the owner"
or manufacturer, 4 either voluntarily or through governmental
mandate," as well as the increasingly ubiquitous GPS capabilities of
Law School in February 2012, and reporting that panelist Andrew Weissmann, FBI
General Counsel, said that Jones "prompted the FBI to turn off about 3,000 GPS tracking
devices that were in use"). After Jones,which has reportedly caused a "sea change" at the
Department of Justice, the FBI reportedly has had to seek court orders to "obtain
permission to turn the [GPS] devices on briefly-only in order to locate and retrieve
them." Angwin, supra;see also Pete Yost, FBI Chief Describes GPS Problem from Court
Ruling, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB. (Mar. 7, 2012), http://www.utsandiego.com
/news/2012/mar/07/fbi-chief-describes-gps-problem-from-court-ruling/.
11. I discuss the third-party doctrine, its role in Jones, and Jones's potential effect on
the doctrine in Part II.B.
12. The government has available numerous statutorily authorized means to seek user
data from third party service providers. See infra note 16; see also Ellen Nakashima, FBI
Heads to Court More Often to Obtain Data on PersonalInternet-Usage,WASH. POST, Oct.
26, 2011, at A6; Ryan Singel, U.S. Requests for Google User Data Spike 29 Percent in Six
Months, WIRED (Oct. 25, 2011, 11:07 AM), http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2011/10
/google-data-requests.
13. The possibility of private vehicle owners subscribing to a GPS service is well
known. Another permutation of this dynamic is when companies install GPS devices in
their vehicles. See Brief of Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr. (EPIC) and Legal Scholars and
Technical Experts as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent at 25, United States v. Jones,
132 S. Ct. 945 (2012) (No. 10-1259), 2011 WL 4564007 at *25, available at
http://epic.org/amicus/jones/EPICJonesamicusfinal.pdf (discussing and citing to
accounts of GPS use by UPS, Roadway Express, and J.B. Hunt, which is "one of the
nation's largest trucking lines").
14. General Motors's OnStar system, for example, is installed in millions of cars. The
OnStar system uses a combination of GPS and cellular technology, and was recently the
subject of an intense controversy over proposed revisions to its terms of service that would
have authorized OnStar to continue collecting tracking data even after a user
unsubscribed from the service. See John R. Quain, Changes to OnStar'sPrivacy Terms Rile
Some Users, N.Y. TIMES WHEELS BLOG (Sept. 22, 2011, 6:00 AM),
/2011/09/22/changes-to-onstars-privacy-terms-rile-somehttp://wheels.blogs.nytimes.com
users/; Jaikumar Vijayan, OnStar Reverses Course on ControversialGPS Tracking Plans,
COMPUTERWORLD (Sept. 27, 2011, 6:03 PM), http://www.computerworld.com/s/article
/9220337/OnStar reversescourse oncontroversialGPS-tracking.plans.
15. On the governmental mandate front, the Department of Transportation's Federal
Motor Carrier Safety Administration is seeking to promulgate regulations requiring the
installation by commercial motor carriers of electronic on-board recorders equipped with
GPS capability. See Electronic On-Board Recorders and Hours of Service Supporting
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smartphones, all of which involve a third party that provides the GPS
service and collects the location data. A related concern is whether
the third-party doctrine will allow governments to continue to engage
in widespread location tracking through cellular tower triangulation,
a surveillance technique that relies only upon the cellular network,
independent of GPS.'6
Documents, 77 Fed. Reg. 7562, 7562-63 (Feb. 13, 2012) (to be codified at 49 C.F.R. pts.
385, 390, 395). The purpose is to monitor compliance with hours-of-service rules. See 49
C.F.R. § 395.8 (2011). According to the Owner-Operator Independent Drivers
Association, these regulations, as currently formulated, will "monitor[] the movements of
four million... drivers; operating for five hundred thousand... motor carriers; using
3,637,000 vehicles, twenty four hours a day, seven days a week." Brief of Owner-Operator
Indep. Drivers Ass'n, Inc., as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent at 2, United States v.
Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012) (No. 10-1259), 2011 WL 4614423, at *2, available at
http://www.americanbar.org/content/damlaba/publishing/previewbriefs/Other BriefUpda
tes/10-1259-respondent-amcu-ooida.authcheckdam.pdf.
16. See, e.g., Michael Isikoff, The Snitch in Your Pocket, NEWSWEEK, Mar. 1, 2010, at
40, 40-41 (recounting that Sprint Nextel's "manager of electronic surveillance" disclosed
at a private Washington security conference in October 2009 that, to handle demand,
Sprint had established a special website to automate its response to police requests for
cellular telephone tracking data, which allows "law-enforcement agents [to] access the
records from their desks"; the manager is quoted as saying that "[tihe tool has just really
caught on fire with law enforcement" (internal quotation marks omitted)); Eric Lichtblau,
Cell Carriers Called on More in Surveillance, N.Y. TIMES, July 9, 2012, at Al (reporting
that, in response to a Congressional inquiry, cellphone carriers submitted reports showing
that in 2011 they responded to 1.3 million law enforcement requests for subscriber
information); Eric Lichtblau, Police Are Using Phone Tracking as a Routine Tool, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 1, 2012, at 1 (explaining that "[t]he practice has become big business for
cellphone companies... with a handful of carriers marketing a catalog of 'surveillance
fees' to police departments," but noting that police can now obtain their own equipment
that allows independent tracking of cellular location data); Kim Zetter, Feds 'Pinged'
Sprint GPS Data 8 Million Times Over a Year, WIRED (Dec. 1, 2009, 5:42 PM),
http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2009/12/gps-data/
("Sprint Nextel provided law
enforcement agencies with customer location data more than 8 million times between
September 2008 and October 2009, according to a company manager. .").
Cellular tracking is less precise than GPS tracking, but has the potential to be
more pervasive given that it applies to every cellular telephone regardless of whether the
cellular telephone has GPS capabilities. Though heavily divided on the issue, numerous
courts have allowed warrantless location tracking using these techniques, though many of
these cases involved the interpretation of numerous pieces of legislation, principally the
Stored Communications Act ("SCA"), see 18 U.S.C. § 2703 (2006 & Supp. IV 2010 &
Supp. 2012), rather than the Fourth Amendment's third-party doctrine. See In re
Application of the U.S. for Historical Cell Site Data, 747 F. Supp. 2d 827, 829-30 & nn.5-6
(S.D. Tex. 2010) (collecting cases), acq. No. H-11-223 (S.D. Tex. Nov. 11, 2011) and appeal
docketed, No. 11-20884 (5th Cir. Dec. 12, 2011); In re Application of the U.S. for an Order
Directing a Provider of Elec. Commc'n Serv, to Disclose Records to the Gov't, 534 F.
Supp. 2d 585, 599-600 & nn.39-42 (W.D. Pa. 2008) (collecting cases), vacated and
remanded, 620 F.3d 304 (3d Cir. 2010). At least one federal circuit has allowed such
tracking absent a warrant or probable cause showing under the Fourth Amendment. See
In re Application of the U.S. for an Order Directing a Provider of Elec. Commc'n Serv. to
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Though much litigation involving location tracking has focused
upon statutory criteria," the third-party doctrine plays a prominent
role in the background of all these cases. If the Fourth Amendment is
interpreted to impose procedural requirements before access to such
location data can be gained-such as a search warrant-then lessdemanding statutory authority will be invalid. Even if a warrant is not
required, the government might only be able to avoid other Fourth
Amendment strictures, including perhaps a probable cause
requirement, if some constitutional exception applies. In all instances
when a third party service provider actually holds the location data,
the third-party doctrine is the most likely such exception.
Thus, whether the Jones Court addressed the third-party
doctrine, and whether it took a broad or restrictive view of it, was
Disclose Records to the Gov't, 620 F.3d 304, 319 (3d Cir. 2010) (holding that, under the
SCA, the government may obtain historical cellular location data from third party service
providers by showing "specific and articulable facts" that establish reasonable grounds
that a customer's data is "relevant and material to an ongoing criminal investigation"-a
lesser burden than the Fourth Amendment's probable cause standard-but also that
issuing judge has discretion to require a warrant premised upon a probable cause showing
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
Numerous recent decisions have begun to require that the government comply
with the Fourth Amendment's warrant and probable cause requirements to obtain such
location data. See, e.g., In re Application of the U.S. for an Order Authorizing the Release
of Historical Cell-Site Info., 809 F. Supp. 2d 113, 113-14 (E.D.N.Y. 2011) (denying, absent
probable cause showing under the Fourth Amendment, the government's application
under the SCA for two orders directing Verizon Wireless to disclose historical location
data for a cellular telephone over a period of at least 113 days); In re Application of the
U.S. for an Order Authorizing Disclosure of Location Info. of a Specified Wireless Tel.,
No. 10-2188-SKG, 2011 WL 3423370, at *48 (D. Md. Aug. 3, 2011) (rejecting, absent
probable cause showing under Fourth Amendment, the government's application under
the SCA and the All Writs Act to prospectively acquire location data, through use of
cellular network and GPS technology, for a cellular telephone allegedly belonging to the
subject of an arrest warrant); In re Application of the U.S. for Historical Cell Site Data,
747 F. Supp. 2d 827, 840 (S.D. Tex. 2010) (holding, in three criminal investigations, that
the government's application for historical cellular location data spanning two months was
subject to Fourth Amendment warrant and probable cause requirements). Several of these
decisions were issued by district court judges who recently changed course after initially
taking the position that the Fourth Amendment's warrant and probable cause standards
did not apply to such location tracking, at least with regard to historical data. Cf In re
Application of the U.S. for an Order Authorizing the Use of Two Pen Register and Trap
and Trace Devices, 632 F. Supp. 2d 202, 204-05 (E.D.N.Y. 2008) (granting the
government's application under the Pen Register Statute and the SCA for prospective
cellular location data based upon a showing of only reasonable suspicion after concluding
that the Fourth Amendment was inapplicable); In re Application for Pen Register and
Trap/Trace Device with Cell Site Location Authority, 396 F. Supp. 2d 747, 759 n.16 (S.D.
Tex. 2005) (indicating that historical cellular location data "more comfortably fits" the
SCA statutory regime that allows disclosure of such data on less than probable cause).
17. See supra note 16.
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critically important. In a world where third parties-corporations like
Apple, Microsoft, Google, Facebook, Amazon, telephone companies,
retailers, and cable and satellite television companies-already hold
huge amounts of data about us-such as location data, web browsing
history, mapping requests, used Internet search terms, book interests,
and banking and pharmaceutical information18-the stakes in Jones
were tremendously high given that the government might be able to
compel production of this data through a combination of statutory
authority and the third-party doctrine. This is especially true in light
of the certainty that third parties will only amass even more data
about us, such as through existing and improved data mining tools
and algorithms that make data collection an increasingly powerful
identification tool.19
Jones was also important because it may potentially impact
numerous other Fourth Amendment doctrines. Given the facts in
Jones and Fourth Amendment precedent, offshoots of the third-party
doctrine were potentially at issue, such as the assumption-of-risk
18. See, e.g., Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653 (2011) (holding Vermont
statute, which prohibited pharmacies from sharing prescription information with
pharmaceutical companies for data mining and marketing purposes, an unconstitutional
restraint on commercial speech in violation of the First Amendment); CHARLES DUHIGG,
THE POWER OF HABIT: WHY WE Do WHAT WE Do INLIFE AND BUSINESS 182-97 &
n.*, 209-10 (2012) (recounting how data compilation and analysis allowed the retailer
Target to conclude that a teenager was pregnant before her father knew); DANIEL J.
SOLOVE, THE DIGITAL PERSON 168-75 (2004) thereinafter SOLOVE, DIGITAL PERSON];
Kashmir Hill, Facebook's Top Cop, FORBES, Mar. 12, 2012, at 96, 99 (recounting
Facebook's efforts to protect its service, including its responses to law enforcement
requests for user information, and noting that, according to Joe Sullivan, its chief security
officer, "Facebook gets thousands of calls and e-mails from authorities each week"); see
supra note 16 (regarding governmental efforts to engage in location tracking by obtaining
information from cellular telephone companies, or by purchasing equipment that allows
independent monitoring).
None of these concerns even address the privacy implications inherent in the
government simply purchasing informational data from corporations. Cf Paul Ohm, The
Fourth Amendment in a World Without Privacy, 81 Miss. L.J. 1309 (2012) (predicting that,
as private data collection increases, the government's direct surveillance will decrease as it
relies upon the private sector to obtain similar information). Thanks to the third-party
doctrine, these transactions appear to be exempt from Fourth Amendment protections
because the person to whom the data pertains no longer has a protected privacy interest in
it after having shared it with the corporation. Numerous documented instances exist of the
government simply purchasing data from corporations. See SOLOVE, DIGITAL PERSON,
supra, at 169-70.
19. Cf Paul Ohm, Broken Promises of Privacy: Responding to the Surprising Failure
of Anonymization, 57 UCLA L. REV. 1701, 1716-27 (2010) [hereinafter Ohm, Broken
Promises] (explaining that anonymized data can often be easily re-identified, such as by
comparing two sets of data and using a few pieces of identifying information like zip code,
sex, and birth date).
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doctrine, which suggests that voluntary disclosure in a private setting
comes with the unavoidable risk of public disclosure, and the privateversus public-space distinction, which suggests that no protected
privacy interest exists in public movements. Another issue was how
the Fourth Amendment should respond to GPS technology.
Precedent suggested that the answer might depend upon whether
GPS was deemed to be merely sense-augmenting or -enhancing, on
the one hand, or sense-replacing or a disruptive technology, on the
other. Rather than ruling on these grounds, however, the D.C. Circuit
controversially embraced mosaic theory, which extends privacy
protection to aggregated data even if isolated parts of that data are
not protected. In the end, Jones provided guidance on all these issues.
This Article will examine the Jones decision and its potential
impact on Fourth Amendment jurisprudence in three parts. It starts
by providing helpful background information, setting the stage for
more in-depth discussions of Jones and its implications. Part I is
devoted to the background information. Part L.A briefly sets forth the
Jones facts, while Part I.B summarizes the federal court of appeals's
ruling in Jones. Part I.C reviews the many Fourth Amendment
doctrines, such as the third-party doctrine, that were implicated in
Jones and made it such a potentially important decision. Part I.D
summarizes the three separate opinions that were written in Jones.
Part II provides more substantive discussion about the Jones
decision, its holding, and the many implications for future Fourth
Amendment law that emanate from the competing opinions. Part
II.A explores new guidance that Jones provides on several Fourth
Amendment issues and is devoted to Jones's resolution of a decadesold ambiguity about the respective roles of privacy and property as
sources for Fourth Amendment protections. Part II.B examines the
impact of the various Jones opinions on several interrelated Fourth
Amendment doctrines: the third-party doctrine, assumption-of-risk
doctrine, and the distinction between public versus private space. Part
II.C is dedicated to the Fourth Amendment implications that Jones
has for technology and the possibility that mosaic theory will be
brought to bear in this context.
Part III identifies some new questions that Jones raises. Part
III.A explains that Jones leaves unanswered the conditions under
which GPS tracking will be constitutional under the Fourth
Amendment. Part III.B focuses upon a new, offense-specific Fourth
Amendment standard that Justice Alito proposed in his concurring
opinion and that presumably has the support of the three other
Justices who joined him. Part III.C discusses a few interesting
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questions that result from the voting patterns in Jones. Part III.D
explores the implications that Jones has for the general-public-use
factor that the Court has previously emphasized in Fourth
Amendment cases involving advanced technology. Part III.E
examines the possibility that standing law will change as a result of
Jones, and identifies third-party consent as a concept of increased
importance. Part III.F highlights that, in his Jones concurrence,
Justice Alito planted a seed for further restricting the exclusionary
rule based upon whether a search warrant violation implicates the
Fourth Amendment itself or some other legal source.
I. JONES BASICS
A.

Jones FactualBackground
Jones arose out of a 2004 narcotics investigation by the Joint Safe
Streets Task Force of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the
District of Columbia Metropolitan Police Department.20 During the
investigation, the Task Force began focusing upon Jones, who owned
and operated a nightclub in the District of Columbia.2 1 After
engaging in numerous surveillance activities, the Task Force sought
and obtained a warrant authorizing the installation of a GPS device
onto the vehicle Jones primarily used (the vehicle was registered to
his spouse).22
The Task Force, however, failed to comply with the warrant. The
warrant authorized installation of the GPS device within ten days and
only within the District of Columbia, but the Task Force installed the
device eleven days after the warrant issued and did so in Maryland.23
Thus, the installation of the GPS device, as well as its subsequent
monitoring for twenty-eight days anytime the vehicle was in motion,2 4
were warrantless.
The D.C. Circuit'sRuling in Jones
The D.C. Circuit held that law enforcement engaged in an
unconstitutional search under the Fourth Amendment when it
B.

20. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 948 (2012); United States v. Maynard, 615
F.3d 544, 549 (D.C. Cir. 2010), cert. granted sub nom. United States v. Jones, 131 S. Ct.
3064 (2011).
21. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 948.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.
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conducted warrantless GPS tracking of Jones's vehicle for twentyeight days.2 5 Controversially, the D.C. Circuit latched onto the
prolonged nature of the surveillance to invoke the "mosaic theory." 6
In a search and seizure context, mosaic theory posits that privacy
interests, such as those protected under the Fourth Amendment,
should be protected in a manner that guards against collections of
small bits of information that individually may not be particularly
revealing but when aggregated may reveal a great deal." By doing so,
the court avoided the precedent of United States v. Knotts," a beeper
surveillance case that strongly suggested that Jones enjoyed no
privacy protections in his public movements because "[a] person
traveling in an automobile on public thoroughfares has no reasonable
expectation of privacy in his movements from one place to another."29
The D.C. Circuit explained:
Here the police used the GPS device not to track Jones's
"movements from one place to another," but rather to track
Jones's movements 24 hours a day for 28 days as he moved
among scores of places, thereby discovering the totality and
pattern of his movements from place to place to place.
[W]e hold the whole of a person's movements over the
course of a month is not actually exposed to the public because
the likelihood a stranger would observe all those movements is
not just remote, it is essentially nil....
25. Maynard, 615 F.3d at 555-67.
26. Id. at 562; see also id. at 564 & n.* (distinguishing prior cases based upon limited
versus prolonged GPS surveillance).
27. In the legal realm, mosaic theory originated in the context of national security law
and freedom of information requests. See id. at 562 (referring to mosaic theory "often
[being] invoked by the Government in cases involving national security information"); see,
e.g., Meredith Fuchs, Judging Secrets: The Role Courts Should Play in Preventing
Unnecessary Secrecy, 58 ADMIN. L. REV. 131, 135 (2006); Christina E. Wells, CIA v.
SIMS: Mosaic Theory and Government Attitude, 58 ADMIN. L. REV. 845 passim (2006);
David E. Pozen, Note, The Mosaic Theory, National Security, and the Freedom of
Information Act, 115 YALE L.J. 628 passim (2005). Though he does not use the term
"mosaic theory," among law professors, Dan Solove has been an intellectual leader in
extending the concept into privacy law in general and Fourth Amendment law in
particular. See DANIEL J. SOLOVE, NOTHING TO HIDE: THE FALSE TRADEOFF BETWEEN
PRIVACY AND SECURITY 102-10 (2011) (using term "digital dossiers"); id at 182-98
(discussing data mining); DANIEL J. SOLOVE, UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY 117-21 (2008)
(using concept of "aggregation"); SOLOVE, DIGITAL PERSON, supra note 18, at 42-47,

168-85.
28. 460 U.S. 276 (1983).
29. Id. at 281.
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The whole of one's movements over the course of a month
is not constructively exposed to the public because, like a rap
sheet, that whole reveals far more than the individual
movements it comprises. The difference is not one of degree
but of kind, for no single journey reveals the habits and patterns
that mark the distinction between a day in the life and a way of
life, nor the departure from a routine that, like the dog that did
not bark in the Sherlock Holmes story, may reveal even more."o
This mosaic approach is controversial because it suggests that
some limited degree of warrantless GPS tracking would be
constitutional under the Fourth Amendment, but too much is not.
Where the dividing line is located, and how it is identified, remains a
mystery. The United States sought en banc review, which the D.C.
Circuit denied over a vigorous dissent that gamely challenged the
mosaic theory.
The panel opinion seems to recognize that Jones had no
reasonable expectation of privacy in any particular datum
revealed by the GPS-augmented surveillance, but somehow
acquired one through "the totality of Jones's movements over
the course of a month." In the view of the panel, this is true
"because that whole reveals more ... than does the sum of its
parts." While this may be true, it is not evident how it affects
the reasonable expectation of privacy by Jones. The reasonable
expectation of privacy as to a person's movements on the
highway is... zero. The sum of an infinite number of zerovalue parts is also zero.
Unsurprisingly, the United States targeted the mosaic theory in
seeking a reversal from the Supreme Court, arguing that it leaves law
enforcement officers with too much uncertainty regarding allowable
warrantless GPS tracking.3 2
Jones and Fourth Amendment Theory
Jones was a perfect vehicle for the Court to clarify or even begin
to reformulate Fourth Amendment law because it provided a clear
record and clean procedural history. Furthermore, the case was posed
C.

30. Maynard,615 F.3d at 558, 560-62 (citation omitted).
31. United States v. Jones, 625 F.3d 766, 769 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (Sentelle, C.J.,
dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc) (citation omitted).
32. See infra notes 260-61 and accompanying text.
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at the uncomfortable intersection of numerous and competing Fourth
Amendment doctrines. These included the privacy-versus-property
distinction in Katz v. United States" and Oliver v. United States;34 the
public-space versus private-space distinction underlying the beeper
cases, United States v. Knotts35 as well as United States v. Karo;36 the
third-party doctrine of United States v. Miller3 and Smith v.
Maryland;38 and the technology aspect of Kyllo v. United States" and
other Fourth Amendment cases such as California v. Ciraolo4 0 and
Dow Chemical Co. v. United States."1
Though not necessarily having their origins in Katz, each of these
Fourth Amendment doctrines can be linked back to it. This is one
reason why Jones was such a compelling case: it provided an
opportunity for an honest-and difficult-reckoning with the
famously enigmatic Katz opinion, which assessed the constitutionality
of warrantless electronic eavesdropping on a telephone booth. 2 Did
Katz mean to replace property with privacy, or merely to supplement
property with privacy? Katz's emphasis on privacy served as a
foundation for the later spatial emphasis in Fourth Amendment law,
such as in California v. Greenwood,4 3 which held that the Fourth
Amendment does not protect against warrantless searches and
seizures of garbage left for collection in public areas outside a home's
curtilage." But are such spatial distinctions unfaithful to Katz? After
all, they are difficult to reconcile with its language.4 5 Katz's emphasis
on privacy versus exposure helped lead to the third-party doctrine.
Nevertheless, applying the third-party doctrine to the facts of Katz
itself arguably raises some inconsistencies. If the third-party doctrine
is correct, Katz arguably should have lost given that he knowingly
33. 389 U.S. 347, 351-52 (1967).
34. 466 U.S. 170, 183-84 (1984).
35. 460 U.S. 276, 281-82 (1983).
36, 468 U.S. 705, 716 (1984).
37. 425 U.S. 435, 443-44 (1976).
38. 442 U.S. 735, 743-44 (1979).
39. 533 U.S. 27, 34-37 (2001).
40. 476 U.S. 207, 213-15 (1986).
41. 476 U.S. 227, 238-39 (1986).
42. See infra Parts II.A.1-2 for an in-depth discussion of the uncertainties resulting
from Katz.
43. 486 U.S. 35 (1988).
44. Id. at 37.
45. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347,351-52 (1967) ("What a person knowingly
exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth
Amendment protection. But what he seeks to preserve as private, even in an area
accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected." (citations omitted)).

2012]

GPS TRACKING

15

exposed his conversation to the telephone company, which could
have accessed not just the telephone number he dialed but also the
content of his conversation. Another question that emerged,
therefore, was whether Katz was distinguishable due to the
technological aspect of the case, and if so, to what extent. Jones
offered the Supreme Court the opportunity to address-and perhaps
resolve-all of these issues.
D. Jones in the Supreme Court.A Summary
Jones covered such a wide swathe of Fourth Amendment
territory because the United States took the most aggressive position
available to it before the Supreme Court. The United States argued
that the Fourth Amendment places virtually no seizure limitations on
its ability to surreptitiously install a GPS device onto a privately
owned vehicle. 6 Furthermore, it contended that it could engage in
GPS searches at will by using the device to follow the vehicle's every
movement in public spaces for as long as it wished, without a warrant
or even any degree of suspicion.4 7 To justify this latter position, it
argued that GPS tracking needs to remain a fully discretionary search
tool so that it can be used to develop probable cause, and thus
imposing a warrant, probable cause, or even reasonable suspicion
requirement would be both unwise and infeasible.

46. See Brief for the United States at 39-46, United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945
(2012) (No. 10-1259), 2011 WL 3561881, at *39-46 [hereinafter Brief for the United
States], availableat http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publishing/previewbriefs
/Other BriefUpdates/10-1259_petitioner.authcheckdam.pdf. The United States accepted
the Fourth Amendment seizure standard of a meaningful interference with a possessory
interest, see Soldal v. Cook Cnty., 506 U.S. 56, 61 (1992), but, relying upon GPS tracking
cases decided by federal circuits prior to Jones, argued that this standard was not met
given that the GPS device installed on Jones's vehicle did not (1) impact his ability to drive
it in any way, (2) divert power from the vehicle, (3) occupy space that could have been
used for other purposes, or (4) impair the vehicle's value due to physical damage or
alteration. Brief for the United States, supra,at 42-46.
47. The United States's position was crystal clear at oral argument. Chief Justice
Roberts described the United States's argument as, "it doesn't depend how much
suspicion you have, it doesn't depend on how urgent it is. Your argument is you can do it,
period. You don't have to give any reason. It doesn't have to be limited in any way, right?"
The United States's reply was "That is correct, Mr. Chief Justice." Jones Transcript, supra
note 2, at 15.
48. At oral argument in Jones, the United States explained:
But I think it's very important to keep in mind that the-the principal use of
this kind of surveillance is when the police have not yet acquired probable cause
but have a situation that does call for monitoring. And I'd like to give an example.
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The Supreme Court, having held oral argument in early
November 2011, quickly issued the Jones opinion in January 2012.49
The opinion is extraordinary because of the unanimity in the result
coupled with the fractured reasoning justifying that result; its
doctrinal implications; and also for its voting breakdown. While the
Court was not as bold as it might have been, it was courageous in its
willingness to depart from the path onto which precedent had set it.
That path, so clearly seeded by Katz and marked out by the Knotts
and Karo beeper cases, which suggested no recognized privacy
interest in public movements,50 must have left the United States
feeling confident that it would prevail. After all, before the D.C.
Circuit ruled against it in the Jones litigation, the United States had
prevailed in every federal circuit-four in all-that had considered
warrantless GPS tracking.5
This one-sided circuit split made it all the more stunning that the
Supreme Court unanimously ruled against the United States in Jones.
Commentators disagreed wildly about the breadth of the Jones
ruling." However, it is a mistake to treat the decision as a narrow
If the police get an anonymous phone call that a bomb threat is going to be
carried out at a mosque by people who work at a small company, the bomb threat
on an anonymous call will not provide even reasonable suspicion under this
Court's decision in Florida v. J.L.
But you can hardly expect the FBI to ignore a credible, detailed-sounding
piece of information like that.
Id. at 17-18. A news report quoted FBI director Robert Mueller as similarly testifying, at a
congressional hearing subsequent to Jones, that:
We have a number of people in the United States who we could not indict, there's
not probable cause to indict them or to arrest them who present a threat of
terrorism, articulated maybe up on the Internet, may have purchased a gun, but
taken no particular steps to take a terrorist act. And [after Jones] we are stuck in
the position of surveilling that person for a substantial period of time.
Yost, supra, note 10.
49. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 945 (2012).
50. See infra notes 179-204 and accompanying text for a more detailed discussion of
Knotts and Karo and how they potentially applied to Jones.
51. In every GPS tracking case to reach a federal circuit prior to Jones, the Fifth,
Seventh, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits had all ruled in favor of the United States. See supra
note 4.
52. See, e.g., Robert Barnes, Supreme Court Restricts Police GPS Tracking, WASH.
POsT, Jan. 24, 2012, at Al; Opinion, Court Rightly Requires Warrantsfor GPS Tracking of
Suspects, DETROIT FREE PRESS, Jan. 27,2012, at A16; Barry Friedman, Op-Ed., Privacy,
Technology and Law, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 29, 2012, at SR5; Editorial, Navigating a GPS
Ruling, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 25, 2012, at A18; Lior J. Strabilevitz, Can the Police Keep Up with
Jones?, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 27, 2012, at 23; Tom Goldstein, Reactions to Jones v. United
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one. Similarly to Katz, the Jones opinion, a 5-4 decision in which
Justice Scalia authored the majority opinion and Justice Alito wrote a
concurring opinion on behalf of the four Justices who refused to join
the majority," is dramatically more important for the reasoning of the
various Justices than for its formal holding. The ruling was technically
narrow: the government's installation of a GPS device onto a vehicle
for the purpose of obtaining information constituted a "search"
subject to Fourth Amendment protections." It provided no guidance,
for example, about the conditions that would render such GPS
surveillance constitutional."
But to limit Jones to this narrow ruling would be a grave mistake
that fails to appreciate Jones's potential to be the most important
Fourth Amendment decision since Katz. The ruling is considerably
more complex than an ordinary 5-4 decision because, though Justice
Sotomayor provided the crucial fifth vote for Justice Scalia's opinion,
she wrote her own separate concurrence in which she indicated a
great deal of approval for Justice Alito's competing approach, and a
remarkable willingness to be even more aggressive in applying it.56
Consequently, each of the three opinions produced in Jones holds the
potential to be important in the future development of Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence.
1. Justice Scalia's Majority Opinion
Justice Scalia, writing the five-person majority opinion on behalf
of three other Justices (Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Kennedy
and Thomas), and joined by Justice Sotomayor, held that the
government's installation of the GPS device to track the vehicle's

States: The Government Fared Much Better than Everyone Realizes, SCOTUSBLOG (Jan.
23, 2012, 4:07 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2Ol2/01/reactions-to-jones-v-united-statesthe-government-fared-much-better-than-everyone-realizes/; Orin Kerr, What Jones Does
Not Hold, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Jan. 23, 2012, 12:50 PM), http://www.volokh.com
/2012/01/23/what-jones-does-not-hold/; Orin Kerr, Why United States v. Jones Is Subject to
So Many Different Interpretations, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Jan. 23, 2012, 4:59 PM),
http://www.volokh.com/2012/01/30/why-united-states-v-jones-is-subject-to-so-manydifferent-interpretations/ [hereinafter Kerr, Different Interpretations];Paul Ohm, United
States v. Jones is a Near-OptimalResult, FREEDOM TO TINKER (Jan. 23, 2012, 1:57 PM),
https://freedom-to-tinker.com/blog/paul/united-states-v-jones-near-optimal-result/.
53. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 945; id. at 957 (Alito, J., concurring).
54. Id. at 949 (majority opinion).
55. See infra Part IILA. For further discussion of the majority's reasoning, see Part
II.A.3.
56. See Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 954, 956-57 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
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movements was a "search" covered by the Fourth Amendment."
Justice Scalia premised his majority ruling upon a property-centric
Fourth Amendment, applying a historical analysis that depended
primarily upon two factors: (1) the government's physical trespass in
installing the GPS device onto Jones's vehicle, (2) for the purpose of
collecting information." This reasoning was revelatory for what it did
to illuminate Katz and its Fourth Amendment treatment of the
concepts of privacy and property, clarifying that both concepts remain
valid Fourth Amendment touchstones and that they can operate
independently.59 Justice Scalia also appears to have intended to add a
third, plain-text factor, namely that this new trespassory test applies
only to items explicitly listed in the Fourth Amendment.60 I will
address this potential third factor in greater detail below."
2. Justice Alito's Concurrence
Four Justices, led by Justice Alito, refused to join the majority
opinion, characterizing as "[i]ronic[]," "unwise," and "highly
artificial" Justice Scalia's choice "to decide this case based on 18thcentury tort law" when at issue was GPS, a "21st-century surveillance
technique." 62 Justice Alito's concurring opinion, written on behalf of
Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, and Kagan, instead preferred to rely upon
Katz's privacy test,' which requires both subjective and objective
privacy expectations.' These Justices would have ruled that, on the
Jones facts, the government's prolonged GPS use violated an
objective privacy expectation that society deemed reasonable, at least
in the context of most offenses.65 (Apparently these Justices
presumed that Jones had a subjective privacy expectation, an issue
Justice Alito did not address.)
Since the point of the Katz test is to resolve when a Fourth
Amendment "search" has occurred,6 6 technically Justice Alito's
rationale would go no further than Justice Scalia's in terms of result:
57. Id. at 949 (majority opinion).
58. See id. at 949-51.
59. See infra text accompanying notes 113-14.
60. See Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 950, 953 & n.8.
61. See infra notes 132-67 and accompanying text.
62. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at957-58 (Alito, J., concurring).
63. See id. at 957-60.
64. See infra text accompanying notes 79, 82-86.
65. Jones, 132 S. Ct at 964 (Alito, J., concurring); see infra text accompanying note
205; Parts II.B-C, III.B.
66. See infra text accompanying notes 85-86.
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namely, the government's activity was a "search" subject to Fourth
Amendment protections. The problematic governmental activity,
however, would be different-only prolonged GPS tracking to
investigate a common offense, completely excluding any
consideration of the GPS device's installation.
3. Justice Sotomayor's Concurrence
Justice Sotomayor's concurring opinion, written only on her own
behalf, is remarkably important due to its breadth. Not content to
merely join Justice Scalia's majority opinion, she explained her
reasons for doing so, emphasizing in particular her agreement with
Justice Scalia's declaration that Katz added privacy to property so
that they are both conceptual Fourth Amendment touchstones, and
that therefore they both enjoy Fourth Amendment vitality.67 Though
Justice Sotomayor did not join Justice Alito's concurring opinion,
depriving it of a fifth vote, she did signal some significant agreement
with it and a ready willingness to provide a fifth vote (though she also
had some significant areas of disagreement). 68 She did not join Justice
Alito's concurrence because "reaffirmation" and application of a
property-centric trespass approach "suffice[d] to decide" Jones.6
Nonetheless, she went out of her way to expound on Justice Alito's
approach and the important role it could play, and explicitly indicated
that she was ready to provide a crucial fifth vote for resolving similar

67. Justice Sotomayor wrote:
The Government usurped Jones' property for the purpose of conducting
surveillance on him, thereby invading privacy interests long afforded, and
undoubtedly entitled to, Fourth Amendment protection.
... As the majority's opinion makes clear ... Katz's reasonable-expectationof-privacy test augmented, but did not displace or diminish, the common-law
trespassory test that preceded it.... Justice Alito's approach, which discounts
altogether the constitutional relevance of the Government's physical intrusion on
Jones' Jeep, erodes that longstanding protection for privacy expectations inherent
in items of property that people possess or control. By contrast, the trespassory
test applied in the majority's opinion reflects an irreducible constitutional
minimum: When the Government physically invades personal property to gather
information, a search occurs.
Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 954-55 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
68. See id.; infra II.B.2, III.C.2; notes 291-97 and accompanying text.
69. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 955 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
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Fourth Amendment claims through an objective expectation of
privacy. 0
Moreover, Justice Sotomayor boldly took on what is so often
Justice Thomas's recurring role as the Justice who declares an
inclination to scuttle decades of precedent and make dramatic
changes to the law. She argued for taking account of the special
nature of GPS surveillance, focusing upon three of its distinct
characteristics. First, she pointed to the amount of information about
search targets that can be aggregated through GPS monitoring.
Second, she mentioned GPS's data storage and mining implications.
Third, and echoing Chief Justice Roberts's and Justice Alito's
comments at oral argument, she noted GPS's "cheap" and
"surreptitious[]" nature that "evades the ordinary checks that
constrain abusive law enforcement practices: 'limited police resources
and community hostility.' "I Because all of these factors can "chill[]
associational and expressive freedoms,"" she explained that she
would consider whether objective expectations of privacy were
70. Justice Sotomayor did so out of concern that Justice Scalia's trespass-centered
approach was unduly narrow because "physical intrusion is now unnecessary to many
forms of surveillance." Id. She further explained that:
As Justice Alito incisively observes, the same technological advances that have
made possible nontrespassory surveillance techniques will also affect the Katz test
by shaping the evolution of societal privacy expectations. Under that rubric, I
agree with Justice Alito that, at the very least, "longer term GPS monitoring in
investigations of most offenses impinges on expectations of privacy."
Id. (citations omitted).
71. See, e.g., Safford Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Redding, 557 U.S. 364, 398-403 (2009)
(Thomas, J., concurring and dissenting in part); Altria Grp., Inc. v. Good, 555 U.S. 70, 91108 (2008) (Thomas, J., dissenting); Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass'n v. Brentwood
Acad., 551 U.S. 291, 306-07 (2007) (Thomas, J., concurring); Tennard v. Dretke, 542 U.S.
274, 294-95 (2004) (Thomas, J., dissenting); Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 56
(2000) (Thomas, J., dissenting); see also Ralph A. Rossum, Clarence Thomas's Originalist
Understanding of the Interstate, Negative, and Indian Commerce Clauses, 88 U. DET.
MERCY L. REV. 769, 769 (2011) (asserting that Justice Thomas "has been unswayed by the
claims of precedent.... Thomas is unquestionably the Justice who is most willing... to
call on his colleagues to join him in ... getting back ... to the original understanding of
the Constitution"); Lincoln Caplan, Editorial, Clarence Thomas's Brand of Judicial Logic,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 23, 2011, at SR10 (describing Justice Thomas's disregard of stare
decisis).
72. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 955-56 (Sotomayor, J., concurring); see infra text
accompanying note 296.
73. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 956 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
74. See infra text accompanying notes 266, 285.
75. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 956 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (quoting Illinois v. Lidster, 540
U.S. 419, 426 (2004)).
76. Id.
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violated through governmental monitoring that enabled the
discernment of what is often closely-held personal information.7
"More fundamentally," she wrote, she was willing to "reconsider" a
major component of currently existing Fourth Amendment law-the
third-party doctrine."
Consequently, though Jones technically reached one binding,
property-centric ruling supported by a majority of five Justices-the
government's trespass in installing a GPS device on a vehicle for the
purpose of obtaining information constituted a Fourth Amendment
"search"-there are four votes for instead reaching the Fourth
Amendment "search" ruling through a Katz-ian privacy approach. 7 9
This latter view, which Justice Sotomayor indicated a willingness to
support," proposes that prolonged GPS monitoring for "most
offenses" violates an objective expectation of privacy." Thus, while
Justice Scalia obtained the five votes for establishing binding law that
are necessary to directly transform Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence, Justice Alito's alternate rationale also holds significant
potential for doing so.
II. JONES AND THE KA TZ CONUNDRUM: NEW ANSWERS TO OLD
QUESTIONS

The difficult choices confronting the Supreme Court in Jones can
all be traced back to Katz. This Part explains how Jones provided an
opportunity for revisiting and better defining Katz, and then details
how Jones responded to that opportunity. As this Part will make
clear, the various Jones opinions have significant implications, either
actual or potential, for numerous core Fourth Amendment doctrines.
A.

Privacy and Property

1. Katz's Infamous Ambiguity
Katz famously moved search jurisprudence to a privacy model.
It did so by rejecting the property-centric Fourth Amendment model
that had previously controlled," and which the Court had applied in
77. See infra text accompanying note 297.
78. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 957 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). I detail her thoughts on the
third-party doctrine below. See infra text accompanying note 227.
79. See Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 957-64 (Alito, J., concurring).
80. See id. at 955 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
81. Id. at 964 (Alito, J., concurring).
82. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351-53 (1967).
83. See id at 353.
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Olmstead v. United States.' Surprisingly, exactly how Katz did so is
not entirely clear. These ambiguities came to the fore in Jones.
Take, for instance, Katz's search test, which has become a
bedrock standard in modern Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. Katz
is ubiquitously cited for its two-prong search standard, which is keyed
to reasonable expectations of privacy (rather than to property): a
Fourth Amendment search occurs only if the target had (1) an actual
expectation of privacy (the subjective prong), (2) that society accepts
as reasonable (the objective standard)." But this two-prong standard
never appears in the majority opinion. It is not even obliquely
referenced. Instead, it has been derived from Justice Harlan's
concurring opinion, in which-writing only for himself-he states,
"My understanding of the rule that has emerged from prior decisions
is that there is a twofold requirement, first that a person have
exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and, second,
that the expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as
'reasonable.' "86 In Katz, only Justice Black dissented,' while every
other participating Justice joined Justice Stewart's majority opinion,"
so Justice Harlan's concurring opinion cannot be deemed controlling
in any technical sense because his vote was not needed to establish a
majority. 9 This raises at least two interrelated issues: first, what
exactly the majority meant by invoking and relying upon privacy, and
second, whether Justice Harlan's two-prong search test is an accurate
summation of the majority's position.
The Katz majority was clearly seeking a different Fourth
Amendment search standard than what was available under the
Olmstead property-centric view, writing that the " 'premise that
property interests control the right of the Government to search and

84. 277 U.S. 438 (1928), overruled in part by Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347

(1967).
85. See, e.g., Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 33 (2001); California v. Ciraolo, 476
U.S. 207, 211 (1986); United States v. Walker, 771 F. Supp. 2d 803, 807 (W.D. Mich. 2011).
86. Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
87. Id. at 364 (Black, J., dissenting).
88. See Peter Winn, Katz and the Origins of the "Reasonable Expectation of Privacy"
Test, 40 MCGEORGE L. REV. 1, 2-3 (2009). Justice Marshall did not participate in the
case. Id. at 2.
89. Cf Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977) ("When a fragmented Court
decides a case and no single rationale explaining the result enjoys the assent of five
Justices, the holding of the Court may be viewed as that position taken by those Members
who concurred in the judgments on the narrowest grounds ....
"(citation omitted)
(internal quotations marks omitted)).

2012]

GPS TRACKING

23

seize has been discredited.' "90 This explains why the Katz majority
was (unfairly) critical of the property-based approach to the case that
Katz had concentrated on in his written briefs, which considered
whether a bugged telephone booth was a constitutionally protected
area.9 1
Instead of property, the Katz majority embraced the concept of
Fourth Amendment privacy. The closest thing to a defining standard
that the majority offered was its declaration that:
[T]he Fourth Amendment protects people, not places. What a
person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home
or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection. But
what he seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible
to the public, may be constitutionally protected.'
Exactly what this meant to the Katz majority, and how much
guidance it provides, remains unclear. The majority proceeded to rule
that Katz's privacy expectation had been violated because (1) "what
he sought to exclude when he entered the booth was ... the uninvited
ear,"' thus the booth's visual transparency was immaterial; (2) he
shut the telephone booth door behind him; 94 (3) he "pa[id] the toll
that permit[ted] him to place a call"; and (4) what Katz sought was a
means of "private communication."9 s Due to these factors, the
"[g]overnment's activities in electronically listening to and recording
the petitioner's words violated the privacy upon which he justifiably
relied while using the telephone booth and thus constituted a 'search
and seizure' within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment."9
90. Katz, 389 U.S. at 353 (quoting Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 304 (1967)),
91. Id. at 348-51; see also id. at 351 (referring to "the misleading way the issues have
been formulated"). The criticism was unfair because the parties had framed the issues in a
manner consistent with prior Supreme Court precedent; the Court accepted this framing
when it granted certiorari; and Katz's briefs actually had argued partly in privacy terms.
Winn, supra note 88, at 4-5 & nn.25-27 (setting out the sequence of events that led to Katz
Court's criticism); see also Harvey A. Schneider, Katz v. United States: The Untold Story,
40 McGEORGE L. REV. 13, 17-18 (2009) (providing first-hand account of evolution in
legal reasoning from one of Katz's Supreme Court lawyers). At oral argument Katz's
counsel bravely departed from the specifics of his written argument and essentially
proposed the objective privacy standard the Court adopted in Katz, but this was not
recognized in the opinion at least in part because then-law clerk Lawrence Tribe, who
drafted the opinion on behalf of Justice Stewart, apparently did not listen to the oral
argument. Schneider, supra, at 16-20; Winn, supra note 88, at 2-3, 6 & n.29, 10.
92. Katz, 389 U.S. at 351 (citations omitted).
93. Id. at 352.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 353.
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2. Katz and Silverman v. United States
If there was any doubt that Katz had distanced itself from a
property-centric Fourth Amendment, such doubts seemed resolved in
Oliver v. United States," which explicitly rejected physical trespass as
a basis for finding a Fourth Amendment violation.98 Oliver based its
ruling upon the textual principle, established in Hester v. United
States,99 that Fourth Amendment search proscriptions do not apply to
open fields because such fields are not "persons, houses, papers, [or]
effects."'"
What, then, should one make of Silverman v. United States,o1
which predates Katz and has never been overruled, but based its
ruling on Olmstead's property-centric Fourth Amendment model?0 2
In Silverman, the Supreme Court found a Fourth Amendment
violation when police eavesdropped using a microphone that
physically intruded-albeit barely-into a row house that the
defendants were using for a gambling operation. 13 The Court faulted
the "unauthorized physical encroachment within a constitutionally
protected area"10 4 because:
At the very core [of the Fourth Amendment] stands the right of
a man to retreat into his own home and there be free from
unreasonable governmental intrusion. This Court has never
held that a federal officer may without warrant and without
consent physically entrench into a man's office or home, there
secretly observe or listen, and relate at the man's subsequent
criminal trial what was seen or heard. 05

97. 466 U.S. 170 (1984).
98. Id. at 181,182-84.
99. 265 U.S. 57 (1924) (holding that police may enter and search open fields without a
warrant).
100. U.S. CONST. amend. IV; Oliver, 466 U.S. at 176-77.
101. 365 U.S. 505 (1961).
102. See id. at 511-12.
103. Id. at 506-07, 509-10. Police used a "microphone with a spike about a foot long
attached to it," inserting the spike "several inches" into a shared "party wall" between two
row houses until the spike hit a heating duct, "thus converting [the defendants'] entire
heating system into a conductor of sound." Id. at 506-07.
104. Id. at 510.
105. Id. at 511-12 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
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The Court denied that its ruling was based upon trespass as defined
by local law," but clearly the ruling was based upon a traditional
10
view of common law trespass.o
Perhaps Silverman is justified based on the same textual
approach the Court applied in Hester and Oliver because Silverman
involved surveillance on a house, with houses being at the core of
Fourth Amendment protections, both conceptually and textually. But
while that might justify Silverman, it does not explain Katz, which
involved aural surveillance of a telephone booth. Neither oral
conversations nor public telephone booths satisfy a Fourth
Amendment textual analysis because, as with open fields, they are not
"persons, houses, papers, [or] effects." 0 s
The Court's inconsistency in applying Fourth Amendment
textualism is masking an uncertainty concerning whether the
Olmstead-Silvermanproperty-centric model retains vitality after Katz,
which left the parties in Jones jockeying for position on the
potentially dispositive issue of whether the installation of the GPS
device, in and of itself, constituted a Fourth Amendment search. Did
Katz mean to supplement property with privacy, or to supplant
property with privacy? Jones argued supplementation, emphasizing
that Silverman remains good law and its physical encroachment rule
should be applied to render the warrantless installation of the GPS
device unconstitutional.'0 The United States argued that Katz
supplanted property to such an extent that Silverman was no longer
106. See id. at 512 (explaining that the "decision here does not turn upon the
technicality of a trespass upon a party wall as a matter of local law. It is based upon the
reality of an actual intrusion into a constitutionally protected area.").
107. See, e.g., Rende McDonald Hutchins, Tied Up in Knotts? GPS Technology and the
Fourth Amendment, 55 UCLA L. REV. 409, 423 (2007); Orin S. Kerr, The Fourth
Amendment and New Technologies: Constitutional Myths and the Case for Caution, 102
MICH. L. REV. 801, 816 (2004); Ric Simmons, From Katz to Kyllo: A Blueprint for
Adapting the Fourth Amendment to Twenty-First Century Technologies, 53 HASTINGS L.J.
1303, 1309 (2002); Sara M. Smyth, Searches of Computers and Computer Dataat the United
States Border: The Need for a New Framework Following United States v. Arnold, 2009 U.
ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL'Y, 69, 85 (2009); Russell L. Weaver, The Fourth Amendment,
Privacy and Advancing Technology, 80 MISS. L.J. 1131, 1140 (2011).
108. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. This, of course, is a primary argument that Justice Black
made in his Katz dissent. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 364-67 (1967) (Black, J.,
dissenting). Justice Scalia has also criticized Katz on this ground. See infra note 166 and
accompanying text. But see infra note 164 (noting that Justice Scalia has indicated that he
does not believe there is any chance the Court will depart from Katz).
109. Brief for Respondent at 19 & n.2, United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012)
*19,
available
at
WL
4479076,
at
(No.
10-1259),
2011
http://www.law.nyu.edulecm-dlv3/groups/public/@nyujawwebsite-alumnildocuments/d
ocuments/ecm-pro070386.pdf.
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controlling, and instead the Katz standard-whether the installation
violated a privacy interest upon which Jones reasonably reliedcontrolled.n0
3. Justice Scalia's Resolution in Jones
Had Jones done nothing else, it would be a cornerstone Fourth
Amendment opinion for conclusively resolving all this uncertainty.
Justice Scalia's five-person majority opinion premised its ruling that a
search covered by the Fourth Amendment had occurred upon a
historically-based, property-centric trespass theory that focuses upon
(1) the government's installation of the GPS device; (2) for the
purpose of obtaining information."' In establishing this new
trespassory test, Jones provides binding precedent regarding Katz's
property-versus-privacy ambiguity. Justice Scalia's majority opinion
repeatedly emphasizes that Katz merely added privacy to the Fourth
Amendment calculus, ratherthan replacingproperty. In clarifying this
point, Justice Scalia writes as if there has been no ambiguity about
it." 2 His opinion explains that:
Jones's Fourth Amendment rights do not rise or fall with the
Katz [reasonable expectation of privacy] formulation.... [Flor
most of our history the Fourth Amendment was understood to
embody a particular concern for government trespass upon the
areas... it enumerates. Katz did not repudiate that
110. See Brief for the United States, supra note 46, at 46 n.6. To the extent that
installation of the GPS device was analyzed as a seizure, the United States argued that the
traditional Fourth Amendment seizure standard applied and was not satisfied. See supra
note 46.
111. See United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 948 (2012) ("We decide whether the
attachment of a Global-Positioning-System (GPS) tracking device to an individual's
vehicle, and subsequent use of that device to monitor the vehicle's movements on public
streets, constitutes a search or seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.");
id. at 949 ("We hold that the Government's installation of a GPS device on a target's
vehicle, and its use of that device to monitor the vehicle's movements, constitutes a
'search.' ") (footnote omitted); id. at 950 n.3 ("[Our task, at a minimum, is to decide
whether the action in question would have constituted a 'search' within the original
meaning of the Fourth Amendment. Where, as here, the Government obtains information
by physically intruding on a constitutionally protected area, such a search has undoubtedly
occurred."); id. at 951 n.5 ("Trespass alone does not qualify, but there must be conjoined
with that what was present here: an attempt to find something or to obtain information.");
id. ("A trespass on 'houses' or 'effects,' or a Katz invasion of privacy, is not alone a search
unless it is done to obtain information; and the obtaining of information is not alone a
search unless it is achieved by such a trespass or invasion of privacy.").
112. In a post-Jones speech to the American Bar Association, he reportedly called the
decision "pretty easy." Debra Cassens Weiss, Scalia Explains Stance on Abortion, GPS
Ruling, A.B.A. J., Mar. 2012, at 59.
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understanding ...
. . . Katz ... established that "property rights are not the
sole measure of Fourth Amendment violations," but did not
"snuf[f] out the previously recognized protection for
property.""'

If this guidance were not clear enough, for good measure Justice
Scalia added the crystal-clear statement that "the Katz reasonableexpectation-of-privacy test has been added to, not substituted for, the
common-law trespassory test." 1 14 In support, Justice Scalia cited two
post-Katz cases, Alderman v. United States"' and Soldal v. Cook
County,"' in which a property model was applied to the Fourth
Amendment claims at issue."' Though Justice Scalia insists that
history and precedent readily lead to this conclusion, the four Justices
led by Justice Alito did not think so," and I am not the only
commentator to react with skepticism."
With Justice Sotomayor's fifth vote, Justice Scalia's new
trespassory test, and his resolution of the Katz privacy-versus113. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 950-51 (footnotes omitted) (quoting Soldal v. Cook Cnty., 506
U.S. 56,64 (1992)).
114. Id. at 952.
115. 394 U.S. 165 (1969).
116. 506 U.S. 56 (1992).
117. See id. at 61; Alderman, 394 U.S. at 176-80.
118. See Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 959-60 (Alito, J., concurring) (claiming that Katz "finally
did away with the old [trespass-based] approach," and explaining that under Katz's new
privacy regime " 'an actual trespass is neither necessary nor sufficient to establish a
constitutional violation' ") (quoting United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 713 (1984)
(emphasis added)). One commentator has described these four Justices as having taken
"the position that Katz had completely eviscerated the trespass doctrine." Shaun B.
Spencer, GPS Monitoring Device Leads the Supreme Court to a Crossroads in Privacy
45,
57
(2012),
ON
REMAND
L.
REV.
NEW
ENG.
Law,
46
http://www.nesl.edu//userfiles/file/LawReview/Vol46/SpencerFINAL.pdf.
119. See, e.g., Caren Myers Morrison, The Drug Dealer, the Narc, and the Very Tiny
Constable: Reflections on United States v. Jones, CAL. L. REV. CIRCUIT (Apr. 15, 2012,
3:45 PM), http://www.californialawreview.org/articles/the-drug-dealer-the-narc-and-thevery-tiny-constable-reflections-on-united-states-v-jones (characterizing as a "sleight of
hand" that Justice Scalia "painted his new test not as an abrupt turn away from modern
Fourth Amendment understandings but as the continuation of an uninterrupted strand of
property-based jurisprudence"); id. ("Four decades of legal scholarship and
jurisprudence ... understood Katz as replacing a property-based view of Fourth
Amendment rights with one based on privacy."); Kerr, Different Interpretations,supra
note 52 ("Justice Scalia creates a new test for Fourth Amendment searches without being
fully candid that he's doing something quite new.... Scalia writes his opinion as if a wellestablished trespass test existed that he is returning to, and that returning to it is some sort
of obvious step. The disjunct between Scalia's doctrinal innovation and his apparent
incredulity that anyone could find his opinion confusing makes for some very strange
reading.").
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property ambiguity, are now binding majority rulings. Justice
Sotomayor was attracted enough to Justice Scalia's property-centric
theory to join his opinion because his trespass approach "reflects an
irreducible constitutional minimum: When the Government
physically invades personal property to gather information, a search
occurs."120 Moreover, she clearly agreed with Justice Scalia on his
resolution of the Katz ambiguity, specifying in her concurring opinion
that:
In Katz, this Court enlarged its then-prevailing focus on
property rights by announcing that the reach of the Fourth
Amendment does not "turn upon the presence or absence of a
physical intrusion." As the majority's opinion makes clear,
test
Katz's reasonable-expectation-of-privacy
however,
augmented, but did not displace or diminish, the common-law
trespassory test that preceded it.12 '
Jones thus resolves the Katz-Silverman ambiguity stemming from
the privacy-versus-property dichotomy so that it is now clear and
undeniable that both remain important and valid Fourth Amendment
concepts, Katz for its use of privacy and Silverman for its use of
property. Though Katz overruled Olmstead and its property-centric
approach to Fourth Amendment surveillance law, a property-centric
Fourth Amendment maintains its vitality. Given the Jones facts, this
is clearly true in the surveillance arena, and given Justice Scalia's
expansive language it is likely true as'a general Fourth Amendment
proposition as well. For example, his new trespassory test would have
provided a stronger and certainly clearer rationale to justify the
outcome in Arizona v. Hicks,'22 which is infamous for its ruling that
the touching and slight movement of a stereo component to reveal its
serial number violated a privacy barrier and thus constituted an
unreasonable Fourth Amendment search.123
On first blush, the first two portions of this new property-centric
standard-(1) physical trespass, (2) for the purpose of obtaining
information-seem easily applied, but further exposition will be
necessary to confirm this point. For example, how convoluted might
the trespass inquiry get? If historical analysis is relevant, that could
120. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 955 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
121. Id. (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967)).
122. 480 U.S. 321 (1987).
123. Id. at 324-27; cf. id. at 332-33 (Powell, J., dissenting) ("With all respect, this
distinction between 'looking' at a suspicious object in plain view and 'moving' it even a
few inches trivializes the Fourth Amendment.").
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potentially introduce complications because the common law
recognized numerous forms of trespass. 2 4 These complications open
the prospect for relitigating a formerly discredited trespass
argument-trespass ab initio-in cases involving undercover agents
or informants,125 though Justice Scalia signaled that such an argument
should continue to be rejected.12 6 Under contemporary law, should
the standard account for state or local variations in trespass law, or
between criminal and civil trespass? Given the straightforward mode
of trespass analysis Justice Scalia applied in Jones, it is likely that he
meant to incorporate a simple trespass standard-requiring only
physical invasion without consent-so that police have a clear and
simple standard with which to comply. But even such an approach
does not necessarily provide sufficient clarity. For example, it is
unclear whether Justice Scalia's new trespassory standard could
resolve the pending Supreme Court case of Florida v. Jardines,127
which raises a challenge to police incursion onto private property,
without probable cause, to conduct a dog sniff at a home's front
door.'2 Moreover, whether his new trespassory standard develops in
the way he envisions as it is litigated in lower courts remains to be
seen. Just how physical must the "physical" trespass be? Would
disturbing the merest blade of grass count? 29 Would "electronic
124. See 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE,

COMMENTARIES *208-10, *213. Under the

common law, an action in trespass vi et armis (by force and arms) could lie for "taking or
detaining a man's goods," and also for "any misfeasance, or act of one man whereby
another is injuriously treated or damnified" if "the act itself is directly and immediately
injurious to the person or property of another, and therefore necessarily accompanied
with some force." Id. at *208-09. However, "if the injury is only consequential," then a
trespass on the case applied. Id. at *209. Trespass by breaking his close protected against
"unwarranted entry on another's soil." Id. This category of trespass could apply to the
home and protected curtilage, even if it did not apply to open fields, which currently do
not enjoy Fourth Amendment protection, see infra notes 184-85 and accompanying text.
125. Trespass ab initio (from the beginning) might become relevant in cases of
undercover governmental agents or informants because it applies "where a man
misdemeans himself, or makes an ill use of the authority which the law intrusts him." 3
BLACKSTONE, supra note 124, at *213. Prior to embracing a privacy model in Katz, the
Supreme Court had rejected a trespass ab initio argument in a Fourth Amendment
challenge to governmental eavesdropping using electronic equipment surreptitiously
carried by an informant. On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747,752 (1952).
126. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 952 (discussing United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705 (1984), and
citing On Lee, to suggest that Fourth Amendment challengers must accept containers and
informants as they come because the government can rely upon previously obtained thirdparty consent).
127. Jardines v. State, 73 So. 3d 34 (Fla. 2011), cert. granted,132 S. Ct. 995 (2012).
128. Id. at 35-36, 55-56.
129. See Dougherty v. Stepp, 18 N.C. (1 Dev. & Bat.) 371, 372 (1835) ("[I]t is an
elementary principle, that every unauthorised, and therefore unlawful entry, into the close
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trespassing" count, as in the case of unauthorized access to hard
drives, networks, or websites? Some courts have suggested that it
could, with the trespass being based upon the transmission or
disruption of electrons."s0 Could a device that emits penetrative
radiation satisfy the physical invasion factor? 131
With regard to Justice Scalia's potential third, plain-text factornamely, that his new trespassory test applies only to Fourth
Amendment enumerated items 1 2-there is room to debate its
existence, its endurance, and its legitimacy. One question that arises
in connection with this factor is why Justice Scalia identified it at all.
The only answer Justice Scalia suggests is that it is a necessary
component so that his new trespassory test does not conflict with
precedent. Justice Alito's concurring opinion criticized Justice Scalia
for adopting a property-centric approach that is unfaithful to Fourth
Amendment precedent, citing the Oliver and Hester open-field cases
as examples that deny Fourth Amendment protections despite
(1) property rights having been infringed through trespass, (2) for the
purpose of gaining information (the two primary factors Justice Scalia
emphasized in his Jones majority opinion). 3 3 This is where Justice
Scalia's third, plain-text factor comes in. In response to Justice Alito's
critique, Justice Scalia simply asserted that open fields fail a plain-text
approach: "Quite simply, an open field, unlike the curtilage of a
home, is not one of those protected areas enumerated in the Fourth
Amendment. The Government's physical intrusion on such an areaunlike its intrusion on the 'effect' at issue here-is of no Fourth
This resolution was analytically
Amendment significance.""
of another, is a trespass. From every such entry against the will of the possessor, the law
infers some damage; if nothing more, the treading down the grass or the herbage .... ").
130. Justice Alito suggested the same question in his concurrence. See Jones, 132 S. Ct.
at 962 (Alito, J., concurring). As he pointed out, some courts have embraced a trespass to
chattels or trespass to personal property theory in these contexts, such as with regard to
spam email and software robots that automatically download information. See, e.g., eBay,
Inc. v. Bidder's Edge, Inc., 100 F. Supp. 2d 1058, 1069-72 (N.D. Cal. 2000); CompuServe,
Inc. v. Cyber Promotions, Inc., 962 F. Supp. 1015, 1021, 1024, 1027 (S.D. Ohio 1997);
Thrifty-Tel, Inc. v. Bezenek, 54 Cal. Rptr. 2d 468,473 & n,6 (1996).
131. For example, one company sells a vehicle-based mobile X-ray backscatter device,
akin to the new detailed imaging devices used in airports, and markets it by showing the
vehicle moving through urban streets and parking lots, where it can scan everything
around it while producing detailed X-ray images of building, car, truck, and bus interiors.
See

"ZBV"

-

Z

Backscatter

Van,

YOUTuBE

(Sept.

12,

2010)

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=iABPKdOvFxQ.
132. See infra notes 134-136 and accompanying text.
133. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 958-59 (Alito, J., concurring).
134. Id. at 953 (Scalia, J., majority opinion) (footnote omitted) (citations omitted).
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unsatisfying, and thus casts doubt on the plain-text factor's endurance
and legitimacy, as I explain below.
On the endurance front, Justice Scalia never pointedly identified
his plain-text factor anywhere in the body of his majority opinion,
apart from two quick, oblique references."' Justice Scalia explicitly
identified this plain-text factor only in a footnote appended to the
immediately preceding quotation above, in which he explained that
"our theory is not that the Fourth Amendment is concerned with 'any
technical trespass that led to the gathering of evidence.' The Fourth
Amendment protects against trespassory searches only with regard to
those items ('persons, houses, papers, and effects') that it
enumerates."' 6 Compared with the two primary factors of Justice
Scalia's new property-centric theory-a physical invasion amounting
to trespass, for the purpose of obtaining information-which
prominently appear no less than twice in the body of the majority
opinion as well as three times in two footnotes 137-amounting to an
announcement via repeated shouting-the third, plain-text factor is
voiced in a whisper. Nonetheless, numerous commentators have
interpreted Justice Scalia as establishing a three-part test that
includes this plain text factor.13 s However, given the care with which
one must read the majority opinion to identify this third, plain-text
factor, there is reason to doubt its staying power. It can easily be
overlooked even after a careful reading of the opinion, particularly
given that it seems to appear as an appended afterthought in order to
reconcile Oliver and Hester.
This provenance of the third, plain-text factor also calls into
question its legitimacy because it is not apparent why the new Jones
trespassory standard should be limited to enumerated Fourth
Amendment items. This is not a small issue because the enumeration
factor, if it has legs, could have substantive impacts. The enumeration
standard would extend Fourth Amendment trespassory protection in
a Silverman-type of situation because of the trespass into a house,'
but presumably not in a Katz-ian situation or even if a Silverman-type
search occurred at a workplace because, respectively, a telephone
booth is not encompassed within the Fourth Amendment's listed

135. Id. at 950,953 (twice using the word "enumerate[]").
136. Id. at 953 n.8 (internal citation to Justice Alito's concurring opinion omitted).
137. See supra note 111.

138. See, e.g., Morrison, supra note 119; Spencer, supra note 118, at 56.
139. See supra notes 101-07 and accompanying text.
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items, 14 0 and neither is the workplace. It could impact law
enforcement's use of warrantless and suspicionless garbage pulls,
4
' For instance, if
which the Court upheld in Californiav. Greenwood.1
can,
lifting the lid
garbage were left at the curb in a covered trash
might now constitute a physical trespass on a protected property
interest in the can, with the can or lid constituting a Fourth
Amendment "effect." But if the garbage were left at the curb in trash
bags, Greenwood would presumably continue to control because no
protected property interest would apparently exist given that the bags
themselves are intended to be carted off along with the garbage, and
thus the bags are not Fourth Amendment "effects." In all these
scenarios, the governmental conduct could be substantively
indistinguishable and be similarly objectionable, and the Fourth
Amendment interests at issue could be similar. Yet different results
could be reached through application of the enumeration factor. It is
far from clear that different results should be reached in these
examples.
It is admittedly an answer to explain that the differing outcomes
result from the necessity of including an enumeration factor in order
to reconcile Jones with Oliver and Hester, but an answer is not
equivalent to a substantively justified answer. Perhaps the
enumeration factor is historically justified, at least in Justice Scalia's
eyes, but this is far from clear, and certainly enumeration theory is a
contentious means upon which to delineate Fourth Amendment
protections. There is, for example, a debate about whether the
Framers would have considered "ships" to be "effects" subject to
Fourth Amendment protections.14 2 This debate could influence
whether vehicles are "effects"-a position that Justice Scalia
accepts 11-given that Carroll v. United States" extended such

140. This is a point Justice Scalia has previously gone out of his way to emphasize. See
infra text accompanying note 166.
141. 486 U.S. 35 (1988).
142. Compare Fabio Arcila, Jr., The Framers' Search Power: The Misunderstood
Statutory History of Suspicion & Probable Cause, 50 B.C. L. REV. 363, 394-97 & nn.156,
162-63,409-10 & nn.228-29 (2009) (reviewing numerous regulatory civil search regimes in
which the Framers extended, through statute, a probable cause immunity standard to
ships, and arguing that this is evidence of the Framers' Fourth Amendment intentions),
with Thomas Y. Davies, Recovering the OriginalFourth Amendment, 98 MICH. L. REV.
547, 603-08 (1999) (contending that the Framers did not intend the Fourth Amendment to
cover ship searches, especially in the context of regulatory civil searches).
143. See United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945,949 (2012).
144. 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
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treatment by comparing vehicles to ships.145 If Carroll was wrong
about whether ships were historically treated as "effects," then
arguably it was wrong in extending that treatment to vehicles.
Ceasing to extend such treatment would result in a Fourth
Amendment revolution. If vehicles are not "effects," and
enumeration theory is strictly applied, then the large body of cases in
which the Fourth Amendment has been applied to vehiclesl4 6 would
be thrown into disarray.
If enumeration theory is historically justified, does its
codification in Jones plant the seeds for limiting, weakening, or
ultimately ending Katz's privacy model, which cannot be reconciled
with it?l 47 Justice Scalia might respond that the issue is immaterial
given that Fourth Amendment protections can always be claimed
under Katz's alternative privacy approach. But this response has at
least two problems. First, Katz-ian privacy protections do not always
exist, as in the Greenwood example.'4 8 Second, the law should work
toward coherence, and it is far from clear that Justice Scalia's
enumeration factor ultimately promotes it.
Justice Scalia would have done better to directly take on Hester
and Oliver. Oliver relied heavily upon Hester, but Hester's open field
rule is of questionable legitimacy because it relied upon Blackstone's
Commentaries for the proposition that the law has long distinguished
between the home and open fields.'" A significant weakness in this
analysis is that the portions of Blackstone's Commentaries relied

145. Id. at 153.
146. See, e.g., Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 343 (2009); California v. Acevedo, 500
U.S. 565, 574-76 (1991); California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 390-94 (1985).
147. The Court has sometimes tried to reconcile Katz with plain-text analysis, but not
convincingly. See infra text accompanying notes 162-63. Justice Scalia does not believe
there is any chance the Court will depart from Katz, see infra note 164, but he could
certainly be wrong, especially given the artificiality of the all-or-nothing Katz privacy
model. See Sherry F. Colb, What Is a Search? Two Conceptual Flaws in Fourth
Amendment Doctrine and Some Hints of a Remedy, 55 STAN. L. REV. 119, 121-24 (2002);
id at 123 (arguing that "[tihere are degrees of privacy and, accordingly, degrees of
exposure, and one might choose to forfeit some of her freedom from exposure without
thereby forfeiting all of it"). Just as did the GPS tracking at issue in Jones, future
technological advances will only continue to put pressure on this Katz-ian privacy
approach, and particularly on its conception of the third-party doctrine.
148. See supra text accompanying notes 43-44, 141.
149. Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57, 59 (1924) ("[T]he special protection accorded
by the Fourth Amendment to the people in their 'persons, houses, papers, and effects,' is
not extended to the open fields. The distinction between the latter and the house is as old
as the common law." (citing 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 124, at *223, *225, *226)).
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upon all relate to burglary law,' which provides an imprecise
touchstone for Fourth Amendment rights.
From a historical perspective (which Justice Scalia embraces,
including in the Fourth Amendment context"'), trespass law is the
(as Justice Scalia himself has
most appropriate touchstone'
recognized"5 '), and in Hester it was accepted that the revenue officers
committed trespass, and there is no doubt that the state narcotics
officers in Oliver did so.' 54 Thus, a better, more coherent resolution of
those cases would have been to acknowledge that the physical
trespass constituted a Fourth Amendment violation in each case,
though a combination of plain view doctrine and hot pursuit or
exigency could still justify the Hester outcome,' 5 leaving only Oliver
to be overruled. Importantly, this approach would reconcile Hester,
Oliver, and Jones in terms of clarifying that a physical trespass to gain
information results in a Fourth Amendment violation. All of this
would have the benefit of bringing greater coherence to Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence.' Significantly, this approach would still
150. They explain, for example, how the home-as-castle enjoys greater protections
from burglary than a distant barn or warehouse. Blackstone's Commentaries in turn relied
upon similar burglary passages from Hale's Pleas of the Crown and Hawkins's Pleas of the
Crown. 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 124, at *225.
151. See, e.g., Virginia v. Moore, 553 U.S. 164, 168 (2008). On behalf of the majority,
Justice Scalia wrote that "[ijn determining whether a search or seizure is unreasonable, we
begin with history. We look to the statutes and common law of the founding era to
determine the norms that the Fourth Amendment was meant to preserve." Id.
152. See Fabio Arcila, Jr., In the Trenches: Searches and the Misunderstood CommonLaw History of Suspicion and Probable Cause, 10 U. Pa. J. Const. L. 1, 5-6 (2007)
("During [the Framers' era], Fourth Amendment claims as we know them today did not
exist. For nearly a century after the Constitution was adopted there was no constitutional
search and seizure jurisprudence. Instead, search and seizure claims were litigated through
common law trespass or civil law forfeiture." (footnote omitted)); id. at 49-50 & n.181.
153. See Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 143 (2006) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("From
the date of its ratification until well into the 20th century, violation of the [Fourth]
Amendment was tied to common-law trespass.").
154. See Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 173 (1984) (describing that officers
crossed onto private property after bypassing a locked gate and while ignoring a "No
Trespassing" sign); Hester, 265 U.S. at 58 (recounting, in this Prohibition-era case, that
officers entered what they "supposed" was Hester's father's land in pursuit of suspects
after witnessing from "fifty to one hundred yards away" the exchange of "moonshine
whiskey").
155. See Morgan Cloud, The Fourth Amendment During the Lochner Era: Privacy,
Property, and Liberty in Constitutional Theory, 48 STAN. L. REv. 555, 591 n.170 (1996);
Schneider, supra note 91, at 22.
156. It could be argued that, to the contrary, this approach introduces greater
incoherence because it is anti-textualist. This argument focuses upon the Hester and Oliver
arguments that open fields are not "persons, houses, papers, and effects." See Oliver, 466
U.S. at 176-77 & n.7 (explaining that the Framers replaced "property" with "effects" in
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allow nontrespassory, plain-view surveillance of open fields, thus not
5 or
threatening or undermining cases such as California v. Ciraolos'
Dow Chemical Co. v. United States.'8
The enumeration standard also suffers due to its origin in plaintext analysis. Though undoubtedly such analysis often has value, and
though Justice Scalia favors it in part because of the clarity it
promises,5 9 that promise is often unfulfilled," and this problem
might arise in this context as well. For example, though Justice Scalia
has pointedly critiqued Katz for departing from a plain text
approach,16 1 other Justices have claimed that Katz can be reconciled
with a plain text analysis, reasoning that "Katz' 'reasonable
expectation of privacy' standard did not sever Fourth Amendment
doctrine from the Amendment's language. Katz itself construed the
Amendment's protection of the person against unreasonable searches
to encompass electronic eavesdropping of telephone conversations
sought to be kept private." 2 These Justices described Katzunconvincingly-as demonstrating that "the Court fairly may respect
the constraints of the Constitution's language without wedding itself
to an unreasoning literalism."' 6 Thus, it is debatable whether the
plain text nature of this third enumeration factor is justified even on
its own terms.

the Fourth Amendment's final language, and contending that "[tihe Framers would have
understood the term 'effects' to be limited to personal, rather than real, property"). A
formalistic plain-text approach to the Fourth Amendment comes with its own problems.
See infra notes 159-67 and accompanying text.
157. 476 U.S. 207 (1986) (rejecting Fourth Amendment challenge when police used a
35 mm camera to take photos during warrantless plane flyover at 1,000 feet).
158. 476 U.S. 227 (1986) (ruling that the Fourth Amendment was not violated when
EPA agents photographed 2,000 acre outdoor industrial complex from altitudes of 12,000,
13,000, and 1,200 feet with a "standard floor-mounted, precision aerial mapping camera").
159. This promised clarity comes from focusing upon words themselves, as opposed to
some other (in his view invariably inferior) measure such as legislative intent. See Antonin
Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role of United States Federal
Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION:
FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAw 3, 16-37 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997); see also Peter J.
Smith, Textualism and Jurisdiction, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1883, 1887 & n.14, 1899 (2008)
(describing Justice Scalia as "the leading modern proponent of textualism").
160. See Smith, supra note 159, at 1903-04 & nn.92-93 (noting critiques of textualism);
id. at 1923-31 (critiquing textualist promise in context of jurisdictional analysis).
161. See infra text accompanying note 166.
162. Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 176 n.6 (1984).
163. Id.

36

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 91

Moreover, though Justice Scalia restrained himself in Jones by
not launching a direct attack on Katz,'" it is unlikely that his
preferred plain-text approach would bring greater rationality to the
Fourth Amendment. He is no fan of the presumptive warrant rule,
having expressed dissatisfaction with resulting search distinctions that
have left the Court having to assess "when a search is not a search.""'5
He disapproves of Katz as ahistorical and because "the outside of a
telephone booth" is not "a location. .. within the catalog ('persons,
houses, papers, and effects') that the Fourth Amendment protects
against unreasonable searches."166 But, on a coherence scale, his
preferred plain-text approach would not necessarily be an
improvement because it also requires the fiction that some searches
are not searches, which to his credit he acknowledged in Jones.167
Finally, it is worthwhile to push back against a highly disputable
point that Justice Scalia floated in Jones. Justice Scalia apparently
believes that the Supreme Court has only used Katz-ian privacy to
expand Fourth Amendment protections, never to reduce them. 168
This is news to most Fourth Amendment commentators.'16 Cases in
164. During oral argument in Jones,Justice Scalia indicated that he is prepared to live
with Katz rather than fight an uphill battle to overrule it:
Katz established the new criterion, which is, is there an invasion of privacy?
Does-are you obtaining information that a person had a reasonable expectation
to be kept private? I think that was wrong. I don't think that was the original
meaning of the Fourth Amendment. But nonetheless it's been around for so long,
we are not going to overrule that.
See Jones Transcript, supra note 2, at 6.
165. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 32 (2001). For more thoughts on the
presumptive warrant rule, see Fabio Arcila, Jr., The Death of Suspicion, 51 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 1275, 1280-93 (2010) [hereinafter Arcila, Death of Suspicion].
166. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 32.
167. See United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 953 n.8 ("The trespass that occurred in
Oliver may properly be understood as a 'search,' but not one 'in the constitutional
sense.' " (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. IV and Oliver, 466 U.S. at 183)).
168. See id. at 951 ("Katz did not narrow the Fourth Amendment's scope." (footnote
omitted)); Jones Transcript, supra note 2, at 6-7 ("[I]t is one thing to add [the Katz]
privacy concept to the Fourth Amendment as it originally existed, and it is quite
something else to use that concept to narrow the Fourth Amendment from what it
originally meant."); see also id. at 8.
169. See Thomas K. Clancy, What Does the Fourth Amendment Protect: Property,
Privacy, or Security?, 33 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 307, 330-31 (1998) (explaining that early
post-Katz cases "often showed signs that privacy would be a vital source of protection of
individual interests.... However, as the composition of the Court changed, those early
indications gave way to a view that used privacy analysis... to reduce the scope of the
amendment's protections."); id. at 339 n.234 (citing many such commentators); id. at 340
("[AJ liberal Court substituted privacy in lieu of property analysis to expand protected
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which the Court has invoked privacy to reduce or avoid Fourth
Amendment protections, where these outcomes are in tension with a
property model of the Fourth Amendment or its textual protection of
an enumerated item, are easy to find. 17 0 Future Supreme Court
litigants aiming for Justice Scalia's vote would be advised to account
for his rather odd, idiosyncratic take on this post-Katz-ian view of
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.
B. Privacy, Third-Party/Assumption-of-RiskDoctrines,and Public
Space
Katz's move to a privacy model of the Fourth Amendment led to
the development of the third-party doctrine.171 Primary examples of
the third-party doctrine are Smith v. Maryland,17 2 which held that
interests, [while] a conservative Court has employed privacy analysis as a vehicle to
restrict Fourth Amendment protections."); Colb, supra note 147, at 120-21 & n.6 (citing
several such commentators).
170. See, e.g., United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38, 42 (1976) (rejecting Fourth
Amendment claim to protection when standing in a home's threshold because, "[wlhile it
may be true that under the common law of property the threshold of one's dwelling is
'private[]' . . . it is nonetheless clear that ... Santana was in a 'public' place. She was not in
an area where she had any expectation of privacy."); Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322,
335-36 (1973) (rejecting Fourth Amendment protections for personal financial records
provided to an accountant despite that they certainly qualified as either "papers" or
"effects"); Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309, 317-24 (1971) (rejecting Fourth Amendment
protections for "houses" in the context of suspicionless welfare home inspections).
Though, as Justice Scalia himself has asserted, "a vehicle is an 'effect,' " Jones, 132 S. Ct.
at 949, the Court has repeatedly applied privacy concepts to reduce the level of Fourth
Amendment protections that apply to vehicles, even when the vehicle is a motor home
akin to a house. See California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386,390-95 (1985). Similarly, the Court
has repeatedly invoked privacy expectations to uphold even physically intrusive
suspicionless drug searches of adults and minors despite the Fourth Amendment's explicit
protection for "persons." See, e.g., Board of Educ. of Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 92 v. Earls, 536
U.S. 822, 830 (2002); Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 660 (1995); Nat'l
Treasury Emps. Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 677 (1989); Skinner v. Ry. Labor
Execs.' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602,633 (1989).
171. For a very brief description of the third-party doctrine, see supra text
accompanying note 11. For a defense of the third-party doctrine, see Orin S. Kerr, The
Casefor the Third-PartyDoctrine, 107 MICH. L. REV. 561 (2009). Professor Kerr's article
resulted in a series of responses. See Richard A. Epstein, Privacy and the Third Hand:
Lessons from the Common Law of Reasonable Expectations, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J.
1199 (2009); Erin Murphy, The Case Against the Case for Third-Party Doctrine: A
Response to Epstein and Kerr, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1239 (2009); see also Orin S. Kerr,
Defending the Third-Party Doctrine: A Response to Epstein and Murphy, 24 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 1229 (2009). For a suggestion of how to approach the third-party doctrine in
light of advancing technology, see Katherine J. Strandburg, Home, Home on the Web and
Other Fourth Amendment Implications of Technosocial Change, 70 MD. L. REV. 614
(2011).
172. 442 U.S. 735 (1979).
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there is no Fourth Amendment privacy interest in telephone numbers
dialed from one's home because the telephone company keeps
records of those numbers,"' and United States v. Miller,17 4 which held
that no such privacy interest exists in one's banking records because
the bank holds them. 7 s The third-party doctrine is closely related to
the Fourth Amendment assumption-of-risk doctrine, under which
privacy interests in information can be lost when voluntarily shared
with a third party because one assumes the risk that the third party
will disclose the information."' The assumption-of-risk doctrine is
particularly prevalent in the context of informants"' and cooccupants. 178
The third-party and assumption-of-risk doctrines played a central
role in Jones because they led to the United States v. Knotts'7 9 and
United States v. Karos0 beeper precedents, which relied upon a
public- versus private-space distinction in resolving challenges to
warrantless search activity. In both Knotts and Karo, law enforcement
officers installed beeper devices into containers that were placed into
vehicles, and then used the beepers to track the vehicles as they
traveled public roads.'' Relying upon the third-party and
assumption-of-risk doctrines, the Supreme Court upheld the
warrantless beeper surveillance. The Knotts Court cited Smith and
reasoned that:

173. Id. at 741-46. Smith was superseded by a statutory enactment that limits the use of
pen registers. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3121-27 (2006 & Supp. III 2010 & Supp. IV 2011). After
the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, Congress statutorily authorized the Attorney
General to use pen registers without prior court approval in emergency circumstances
relating to international terrorism and foreign intelligence. See 50 U.S.C. §§ 1842-43 (2006
& Supp. II 2009 & Supp. III 2010 & Supp. IV 2011).
174. 425 U.S. 435 (1976).
175. Id. at 440-45. Miller was superseded by the Right to Financial Privacy Act of 1978,
Pub. L. No. 95-630, 92 Stat. 3697 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 3401-22 (2006)),
which effectively created "a statutory Fourth Amendment for bank customers." Davidov
v. SEC, 415 F. Supp. 2d 386, 387 (S.D.N.Y. 2006); see also id. at 387-88 (describing RFPA
regime that provides bank customers a process for contesting government subpoenas
seeking access to their bank records).
176. See, e.g., United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 117 (1984); Frazier v. Cupp, 394
U.S. 731, 740 (1969).
177. See, e.g., United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 752 (1971); Hoffa v. United States,
385 U.S. 293, 302-03 (1966).
178. See United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 171 & n.7 (1974).
179. 460 U.S. 276 (1983).
180. 468 U.S. 705 (1984).
181. Id. at 708; Knotts, 460 U.S. at 278.
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When [the driver] traveled over the public streets he voluntarily
conveyed to anyone who wanted to look the fact that he was
traveling over particular roads in a particular direction, the fact
of whatever stops he made, and the fact of his final destination
when he exited from public roads onto private property.
Visual surveillance from public places ... would have
sufficed to reveal all of these facts to the police. The fact that
the officers in this case relied not only on visual surveillance,
but also on the use of the beeper to signal the presence of [the]
automobile to the police receiver, does not alter the situation.8 2
The Karo Court adhered to this Knotts reasoning and did not dispute
the legitimacy of warrantless beeper surveillance on public roads."8
Knotts and Karo thus built upon the third-party doctrine to
create a private- versus public-space distinction that can resolve the
reasonable expectation of privacy inquiry that Katz demands. This
private-public space distinction has served as a Fourth Amendment
foundational concept, as it can explain, for example, the distinction
between curtilage, which can enjoy Fourth Amendment protection,18
and open fields, which do not,8 as well as why the government is free
to search at will the garbage you leave at your curb.'"'
Predictably, in Jones the United States relied heavily upon
Knotts and Karo, asserting that the private-public space distinction
allowed warrantless GPS tracking on public roads." At oral
182. Knotts, 460 U.S. at 281-82.
183. See Karo, 468 U.S. at 715. Given the specific issue presented, the Karo Court
rejected the Fourth Amendment legitimacy of the warrantless beeper surveillance under
review because it involved beeper "monitoring... inside [a] house, a fact that could not
have been visually verified" from a public area. Id.; see also id. at 714-17 (discussing why
beeper monitoring of a private residence "violates the Fourth Amendment rights of those
who have a justifiable interest in the privacy of the residence").
184. See United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294,300-01 (1987).
185. Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 178-80 (1984); Hester v. United States, 265
U.S. 57,59 (1924).
186. See California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 39-44 (1988).
187. This was the crux of the United States's litigation strategy, so much so that the
United States's first few words at oral argument were:
[T]he Court has recognized a basic dichotomy under the Fourth Amendment.
What a person seeks to preserve as private in the enclave of his own home or in a
private letter or inside of his vehicle when he is traveling is a subject of Fourth
Amendment protection. But what he reveals to the world, such as his movements
in a car on a public roadway, is not.
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argument, this contention most vexed the Justices, with seven of
them-all except Justices Thomas and Alito-speaking to the issue.
Early on, Chief Justice Roberts asked the United States, "You think
there would... not be a search if you put a GPS device on all of our
cars, monitored our movements for a month? You think you're
entitled to do that under your theory?"'" The startled Deputy
Solicitor General stammered, "The Justices of this Court?"18 After
the courtroom's laughter ebbed, Chief Justice Roberts responded,
"Yes."' 9 0 The import of the subsequent and somewhat indirect answer
was clear, which led Chief Justice Roberts to confirm, "So, your
answer is yes, you could tomorrow decide that you put a GPS device
on every one of our cars, follow us for a month; no problem under the
Constitution?" 9' Justices Ginsberg'" and Breyer'9 s echoed this
assessment. Justices Kennedy, 194 Sotomayor, 95 and Kaganl 96 all raised
hypotheticals involving GPS tracking of individuals in public spaces.

In Knots v. United States, this Court applied that principle to hold that visual
and beeper surveillance of a vehicle traveling on the public roadways infringed no
Fourth Amendment expectation of privacy.
Jones Transcript, supra note 2, at 3. The United States repeatedly reasserted this argument
that no privacy expectation exists in one's public location, including when determined
through GPS tracking. See id. at 5, 9-11, 20-21, 60.
188. Id. at 9.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Id. at 10. The Deputy Solicitor General answered by pointing out that the FBI
could accomplish the same objective by putting "a team of surveillance agents around the
clock on any individual and follow[ing] that individual's movements as they went around
on the public streets." Id.
192. Id. at 12. Addressing the Deputy Solicitor General, she stated, "Essentially, I
think you answered the question that the government's position would mean that any of us
could be monitored whenever we leave our homes. So, the only thing secure is the home.
Is-I mean, this is-that is the end point of your argument, that an electronic device, as
long as it's not used inside the house, is okay." Id.
193. Id. at 13 (pointing out to the United States that "if you win this case, then there is
nothing to prevent the police or the government from monitoring 24 hours a day the
public movement of every citizen of the United States").
194. Id. at 5 (asking about "a beeper [put] surreptitiously on [a] man's overcoat or
sport coat" that "measures only streets and public elevators and public buildings").
195. Id. at 18 (expressing concern that the United States's aggressive invocation of the
private-public space distinction could allow it to "monitor and track every person through
their cell phone, because today the smartphones emit signals that police can pick up and
use to follow someone anywhere they go").
196. Id. at 57-58 (raising the possibility of "a little robotic device following you around
24 hours a day anyplace you go that's not your home, reporting in all your movements to
the police, to investigative authorities").
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Justices Kagan 7 and Breyer," seeking an explanation as to how the
private-public space distinction could be applied so as preserve Knotts
while invalidating warrantless GPS tracking in public spaces,
compared the latter to tracking by video cameras in London. Later,
Justice Kennedy kept to the same topic but switched locations,
pointing out that "[l]ots of communities have, including Washington,
cameras on-at intersections on stop lights,"'" and asking, "Suppose
the police suspected someone of criminal activity, and they had a
computer capacity to take pictures of all the intersections that he
drove through at different times of day, and they checked his
movements and his routes for 5 days. Would that be lawful?" 2 "
(Chances are that he had no idea such powerful camera surveillance
technology-license plate readers-already exists, and is most
ubiquitous in Washington, D.C.20 1) Justice Sotomayor switched
location again, but this time to outer space, raising the prospect of
satellite-based visual monitoring.2 02 Justice Scalia agreed that the
private-public distinction posed the key difficulty, stating that "our
cases have said that there's no search when-when you are in public
197. Id. at 36 (stating, "[Mjaybe this is wrong, but I'm told that if somebody goes to
London, almost every place that person goes there's a camera taking pictures, so that the
police can put together snapshots of where everybody is all the time," and asking, "So,
why is this different from that?").
198. Id. at 37 ("And, in fact, those cameras in London actually enabled them, if you
watched, I got the impression, to track the bomber who was going to blow up the airport
in Glasgow and to stop him before he did.").
199. Id. at 47.
200. Id.
201. About two weeks after oral argument in Jones, the Washington Post reported that
"[miore than 250 cameras in the District and its suburbs scan license plates in real time"
and that "[wlith virtually no public debate, police agencies have begun storing the
information from the cameras, building databases that document the travels of millions of
vehicles." Allison Klein & Josh White, More Eyes Turn To License Tag Readers, WASH.
POST, Nov. 20, 2011, at Al. The cameras reportedly can "capture numbers across four
lanes of traffic on cars zooming up to 150 mph," obtaining "1,800 images a minute"information that police "download... into a rapidly expanding archive that can pinpoint
people's movements all over town." Id. The database allows police to enter license plate
numbers, and then produces matching results showing historical locations at particular
times. Id. Police can also enter license plate numbers into the database and receive alerts
when a new match is found in real time. Id. The Post reports that Washington, D.C. has
"the highest concentration" of such cameras "in the nation." Id.
This technology is sited differently than the cameras Justice Kennedy mentioned.
In Washington, D.C., about half of these license plate cameras are stationary, similar to
the ones Justice Kennedy mentioned, but the other half are mobile, being "attached to
police cars." Id.
202. Jones Transcript, supra note 2, at 39 (contemplating that the United States might
someday be able to use satellite cameras that "are going to be able to show you the entire
world and let you track somebody on the camera from place to place").
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and where everything that you do is open to-to the view of people.
That's the hard question in the case...."203 Thus, he opined that
Jones would need:
[T]o establish, [under Katz), that there has been an invasion
of-of privacy when all that-all that this is showing is where
the car is going on the public streets, where the police could
have had round-the-clock surveillance on this individual for a
whole month or for 2 months or for 3 months ... .
Katz, then, with its move to privacy and the resulting private-versuspublic space distinction applied in Knotts and reaffirmed in Karo,
posed a significant doctrinal problem for Jones in his effort to claim
Fourth Amendment protections from warrantless GPS tracking on
public roads.
1. Justice Alito's Revolutionary Approach
Justice Alito's concurring opinion in Jones, which he bases upon
Katz-ian privacy, offers two completely new and revolutionary
criteria for determining when an objective privacy expectation can
exist in public space. The first is a temporal limit on surveillance, and
the second is an offense-specific distinction. Though these new criteria
are not binding given that Justice Sotomayor did not technically join
Justice Alito's concurring opinion, her strong suggestion that she is
ready to provide a critical fifth vote means that Justice Alito's
approach is certain to remain in play. (Justice Scalia's propertycentric trespass-based theory eschews privacy and thus has nothing to
say on the private-public space distinction.) Unfortunately, and
shockingly, Justice Alito provides virtually no guidance about how to
apply his approach. This makes Justice Sotomayor's thoughts on the
issue, which she details in her concurring opinion, significant,
especially because she has both important agreements and
disagreements with Justice Alito on the topic.
The totality of Justice Alito's privacy "analysis" follows:
The best that we can do in this case is to apply existing Fourth
Amendment doctrine and to ask whether the use of GPS
tracking in a particular case involved a degree of intrusion that
a reasonable person would not have anticipated.

203. Id. at 40.
204. Id. at 40-41.

2012]

GPS TRACKING

43

Under this approach, relatively short-term monitoring of a
person's movements on public streets accords with expectations
of privacy that our society has recognized as reasonable. See
Knotts, 460 U.S., at 281-282, 103 S. Ct. 1081. But the use of
longer term GPS monitoring in investigations of most offenses
impinges on expectations of privacy. For such offenses, society's
expectation has been that law enforcement agents and others
would not-and indeed, in the main, simply could not--secretly
monitor and catalogue every single movement of an individual's
car for a very long period. In this case, for four weeks, law
enforcement agents tracked every movement that respondent
made in the vehicle he was driving. We need not identify with
precision the point at which the tracking of this vehicle became
a search, for the line was surely crossed before the 4-week
mark. Other cases may present more difficult questions.2 05
Justice Alito's privacy "analysis" is, in a word, cursory. He provides
little in the way of real analysis or reasoned justification to support his
conclusion. This brings to mind one of Katz's great vulnerabilities,
namely that the new privacy standard it introduced was too
amorphous and provided judges with too much power. 206 This, in turn,
has the detrimental effect of potentially reducing the predictive value
of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. Justice Alito did remarkably
little to avoid these criticisms. He did not invoke empirical support;207
nor provide any meaningful evaluation or discussion of social
expectations;208 nor look to literature or art for any guidance as to
how they might speak to resolving the objective prong (despite 1984
and its ubiquitous specter in this context 209 ); nor distinguish
increasingly ubiquitous camera surveillance of public areas, which
potentially allows the functional equivalent to GPS tracking or

205. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 964 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring) (emphasis
added).
206. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 374 (1967) (Black, J., dissenting)
(asserting that "the Framers... did not intend to grant this Court such omnipotent
lawmaking authority" as "to hold unconstitutional everything which affects privacy").
207. For examples of the sort of empirical analysis that Justice Alito failed to employ,
see generally Henry F. Fradella et al., Quantifying Katz: Empirically Measuring
"Reasonable Expectations of Privacy" in the Fourth Amendment Context, 38 AM. J. CRIM.
L. 289 (2011); Christopher Slobogin & Joseph E. Schumacher, Reasonable Expectations of
Privacy and Autonomy in Fourth Amendment Cases: An Empirical Look at
"UnderstandingsRecognized and Permitted by Society," 42 DUKE L.J. 727 (1993).
208. See Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 111 (2006); Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128,
144 n.12 (1978).
209. See supra notes 2-3.
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something near to it;2 10 nor identify any supporting precedent apart
from Knotts, but this invocation, as I will soon explain, is specious.
I will discuss Justice Alito's new temporal limit here, and his new
offense-specific distinction later.211 Justice Alito's temporal limit frees
"relatively short-term monitoring" from Fourth Amendment
oversight but extends Fourth Amendment protections to "longer
term GPS monitoring."2 12 This distinction suffers from an obvious
line-drawing problem. How brief must GPS surveillance be to escape
Fourth Amendment protections? At what point does such
surveillance become so prolonged that an objective privacy
expectation is infringed such that a Fourth Amendment "search" has
suddenly come into being? All we know after his concurring opinion
in Jones is that twenty-eight days of pervasive GPS monitoring meets
the prolonged standard. Justice Alito punts on providing any further
guidance, merely asserting that "[w]e need not identify with precision
the point at which the tracking of this vehicle became a search, for the
line was surely crossed before the 4-week mark."213
This new temporal limit also suffers due to its dubious origins.
The only claim to authority Justice Alito invoked for his novel
temporal limitation is Knotts.214 But that citation, rather than
providing cover for Justice Alito's conclusion, is actually emblematic
of what makes Justice Alito's privacy "analysis" so frustrating, and
will make his suggestion of this new temporal distinction highly
controversial.
Nowhere in the cited portion of Knotts (or in any other portion
of it) is there any mention that a temporal element was playing any
role at all, or that such an element was being used to delineate
between existing and non-existing objective privacy expectations.
This makes Justice Alito's invocation of Knotts to justify his temporal
distinction between brief and prolonged GPS tracking suspect at best
and disingenuous at worst. At the cited pages, the most relevant
210. See supra notes 197-201 and accompanying text. Justice Alito's failure to speak
more substantively to this issue or make any effort to distinguish it from GPS monitoring
is particularly frustrating given that earlier in his opinion he had acknowledged the
phenomenon of increasingly pervasive camera surveillance. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 963 (Alito,
J., concurring) ("In some locales, closed-circuit television video monitoring is becoming
ubiquitous.").
211. See infra Part III.B for a discussion of Justice Alito's new offense-specific
distinction.
212. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 964 (Alito, J., concurring).
213. Id.
214. Id.
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concepts that Knotts discussed are that the beeper surveillance was
(1) of an automobile, which suggests a "diminished expectation of
privacy,"2 15 while (2) "on public streets and highways."216 These
observations led to the Knotts passage most relevant to Justice Alito
in Jones, in which the Knotts Court stated:
A person traveling in an automobile on public thoroughfares
has no reasonable expectation of privacy in his movements
from one place to another. When [the defendant] traveled over
the public streets he voluntarily conveyed to anyone who
wanted to look the fact that he was traveling over particular
roads in a particular direction, the fact of whatever stops he
made, and the fact of his final destination when he exited from
public roads onto private property.1
Having come out on the losing side, the United States might be
forgiven for being in apoplectic shock that Justice Alito apparently
invoked this passage againstit, given that the passage really supports
the United States's assertion-emphasized repeatedly at oral
argument-that Jones should lose because all the GPS tracking in his
case occurred on public roads.218 It is true that Knotts involved beeper
surveillance of an automobile for what was apparently several hours
of one day during a single journey, while Jones involved GPS
monitoring "[e]very 10 seconds of the day for 28 days"219 over all the
journeys that took place during that period. Thus, it is undoubtedly
possible to distinguish Knotts from Jones based on the length of
surveillance involved in each case. Justice Alito, however, could have
been clearer about why he believed that Knotts supported him, rather
than citing to it without comment or discussion as if it directly
supported application of a temporal limit to surveillance under the
Fourth Amendment.
Except for citing Knotts, Justice Alito's concurring opinion
provides no helpful guidance about how to resolve Fourth
Amendment privacy claims apart from its crucial distinction between
brief and prolonged GPS tracking. I will expound on these issues,
including important thoughts that Justice Sotomayor has about them,

215.
216.
217.
218.
219.

United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 281 (1983).
Id.
Id. at 281-82.
See supra note 187 and accompanying text.
Jones Transcript, supra note 2, at 33 (assertion by Jones's counsel).
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in greater detail later because they are closely tied to mosaic
theory.2 0
In any event, after Jones we are left with four Justices clearly
supporting a temporal limit that can influence whether an objective
privacy expectation will exist in a public space,' with a fifth vote
waiting in the wings. 2 22 This factor would introduce into search
jurisprudence a never-before-seen complexity, in which a particular
governmental surveillance activity may or may not be covered by the
Fourth Amendment depending upon how long the government
engages in it. Not only is the inevitable line-drawing that this factor
introduces essentially arbitrary, the factor itself is fundamentally
counterintuitive in that intrusiveness is measured not by the nature of
the challenged governmental surveillance activity itself, but by how
long the government engages in it. This is a highly disputable notion
of intrusiveness, particularly because Justice Alito seems to embrace
it as a means to reconcile Jones with Knotts. But Knotts was not really
about the length of the beeper surveillance that occurred in that case.
The resulting uncertainty that this vague temporal limit would
introduce into GPS surveillance law specifically, and perhaps into
surveillance law more generally or even into Fourth Amendment
privacy law writ large, would likely have the practical effect of
creating a de facto warrant requirement, as Justice Alito himself
implied. 223
2. Justice Sotomayor's Call for Fundamental Reform
Justice Sotomayor concurred separately in Jones in part to
confront the third-party doctrine head-on. More so than any other
Justice in the case, she was willing to stake out an aggressive position.
Though she considered Justice Scalia's trespass approach sufficient to
resolve the case,224 she preferred to write separately to make some
220. See infra Part II.C.
221. These are Justice Alito and the three Justices (Justices Ginsberg, Breyer, and
Kagan) who joined his concurring opinion. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 957
(2012) (Alito, J., concurring).
222. Justice Sotomayor indicated that she was willing to provide a fifth vote to extend
Fourth Amendment coverage to prolonged GPS tracking on privacy grounds. See infra
text accompanying note 326. However, it appears that Justice Sotomayor may significantly
disagree with the limits of Justice Alito's novel temporal factor. See infra text
accompanying notes 327-28.
223. See Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 964 (Alito, J., concurring) ("[W]here uncertainty exists
with respect to whether a certain period of GPS surveil lance [sic] is long enough to
constitute a Fourth Amendment search, the police may always seek a warrant.").
224. Id. at 954-55 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
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broader points given that "physical intrusion is now unnecessary to
many forms of surveillance."22 5 She was particularly troubled by
several aspects of GPS monitoring, which I discuss in greater detail
elsewhere,226 and those concerns were so profound that she declared a
willingness to fundamentally "reconsider" third-party doctrine:
[I]t may be necessary to reconsiderthe premise that an individual
has no reasonable expectation of privacy in information
voluntarily disclosed to third parties. This approach is ill suited
to the digital age, in which people reveal a great deal of
information about themselves to third parties in the course of
carryingout mundane tasks. People disclose the phone numbers
that they dial or text to their cellular providers; the URLs that
they visit and the e-mail addresses with which they correspond
to their Internet service providers; and the books, groceries,
and medications they purchase to online retailers....
[WIhatever the societal expectations, they can attain
constitutionally protected status only if our Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence ceases to treat secrecy as a prerequisite for
privacy. I would not assume that all information voluntarily
disclosed to some member of the public for a limited purpose is,
for that reason alone, disentitled to Fourth Amendment
protection.2 27
Justice Sotomayor's shot across the bow of the third-party doctrine is
not the first one, 228 but there is little reason to think it will amount to
much given that no other Justice joined her critique. Nonetheless, it is
an important signal that there is some sensitivity on the Court to the
third-party doctrine's potentially invasive role when applied to
technological surveillance. Time will tell if any other Justice
eventually rallies around the flag she raised, though Justice Alito's
concurrence, with its refusal to follow the ineluctable logic of the
third-party doctrine and simply extend Knotts to GPS tracking, sends
an interesting signal.

225. Id. at 955.
226. See supra text accompanying notes 73-76; infra notes 296-97 and accompanying
text.
227. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 957 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (emphasis added) (citations
omitted).
228. See supra note 171.
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Privacy, Technology, and Mosaic Theory

1. The Fourth Amendment and Technology: A Summary
A consistent theme in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence is that
courts have struggled with the question of whether, and how, to adapt
it to technological change. The recent, rapid pace of technological
change, which has contributed to an increased interest in preventative
searches as a result of heightened security concerns in a post-9/11
world, has brought new urgency to this issue.
More often than not, the Supreme Court has taken a hands-off
approach to technological development, refusing to recognize Fourth
Amendment privacy barriers to its use. However, the Court has
sometimes been willing to intervene even at the risk of dramatically
changing Fourth Amendment law. Cases like Olmstead v. United
3
1 Dow Chemical Co. v. United
States,"' California v. Ciraolo,o
States,"' as well as United States v. Knotts32 and United States v.
Karo23 exemplify the former trend; cases like Katz v. United States234
and Kyllo v. United States2 5 the latter.
One prominent distinction the Court has applied in Fourth
Amendment technology cases is whether the technology merely
involves sense augmentation or enhancement, on the one hand, or
sense replacement or the use of what the Court believes is a
disruptive technology, on the other.236 Sense augmentation played an
important role in a Prohibition-era case, United States v. Lee,"' in
which the Supreme Court ruled that the use of a searchlight to
observe a ship's deck did not constitute a search because it was
"comparable to the use of a marine glass or a field glass." 238 Over five
229. 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
230. 476 U.S. 207 (1986).
231. 476 U.S. 227 (1986).
232. 460 U.S. 276 (1983).
233. 468 U.S. 705 (1984).
234. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
235. 533 U.S. 27 (2001).
236. See On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747, 754 (1952) (rejecting challenge to use
of transmitter and receiver to overhear conversations because effect was comparable to
"eavesdropping outside an open window. The use of bifocals, field glasses or the telescope
to magnify the object of a witness' vision is not a forbidden search or seizure....");
Joseph L. Bower & Clayton M. Christensen, Disruptive Technologies: Catching the Wave,
HARV. Bus. REV., Jan.-Feb. 1995, at 43,45 (introducing the term "disruptive technology,"
which refers to an innovation, such as the compact disc, that creates a new market and
eventually changes an existing market by displacing a preexisting technology).
237. 274 U.S. 559 (1927).
238. Id. at 563.
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decades later, in Texas v. Brown,239 the Court applied the same
reasoning to justify police use of a flashlight to inspect an
automobile's passenger and glove compartments.240 Similar reasoning
also featured prominently in United States v. Knotts,241 which involved
the tricky problem of distinguishing whether beeper technology was
merely sense-augmenting/enhancing, or instead was sense-replacing.
The sense-replacing argument was a strong one, as the beeper
allowed police to track the container even in the absence of visual
contact. This was vividly demonstrated in the record given that, at
one point, police lost visual contact and even the beeper signal, and
were able to locate the signal again about an hour later only with a
helicopter's assistance.242 The Court, nonetheless, chose to
characterize the beeper as a mere sense-augmenting/enhancing device
based upon what police could have observed, rather than what they
actually observed, reasoning that "[a] police car following [the driver]
at a distance throughout his journey could have observed him leaving
the public highway and arriving at the cabin owned by respondent."2 43
The Court thus invoked the private-public space distinction to justify
characterizing the beeper as a mere sense-augmenting/enhancing
device despite that police had actually used it as a sense-replacing
device. This sleight-of-hand helps explain why many view Knotts, and
its conclusion that "[niothing in the Fourth Amendment prohibited
the police from augmenting the sensory faculties bestowed upon them
at birth with such enhancement as science and technology afforded
them in this case,"' as controversial.
Katz and Kyllo are the most prominent Fourth Amendment
cases in which the Court deemed technology to be sense-replacing or
disruptive enough to justify extending constitutional protection. In
Olmstead, the Court had not deemed aural electronic surveillance to
fall into these categories, 245 but it changed its mind over forty years
later in Katz.'*As for Kyllo, which concerned external surveillance
of a home by police using a thermal imager,2 47 it was the flip side of
Knotts. Both cases involved technologies that could plausibly be
239.
240.
241.
242.
243.
244.
245.
246.
247.

460 U.S. 730 (1983) (plurality opinion).
Id. at 739-40.
460 U.S. 276 (1983).
Id. at 278.
Id. at 285.
Id. at 282.
See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 465-66 (1928).
See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 350-53 (1967).
Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 29-30 (2001).
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described as either sense-augmenting/enhancing or sense-replacing,
but the Kyllo majority chose the latter characterization and thus
extended Fourth Amendment protections. The dissent argued
augmentation, contending that the thermal imager only revealed heat
emanating from a home's exterior walls, which could have been
visually detected from a public place, such as through observation of
melting snow from a sidewalk.248 That the imager more effectively
revealed such information was irrelevant. The majority, however,
held that the imager was sense-replacing because it revealed
information from the home's interior, such as the "hour each night
the lady of the house takes her daily sauna and bath," which could not
otherwise be visually detected from a public place.249
2. GPS as New Technology
A primary issue in Jones was whether GPS monitoring is senseaugmenting/enhancing, or is sense-replacing or so disruptive as to
justify creating an exception to the private-public space distinction in
order to extend Fourth Amendment protections against police
installation of the GPS device or its monitoring on public roads.
Taking this step posed a jurisprudential challenge given the presumed
constitutionality of ubiquitous camera surveillance of public areas,250
a point that troubled numerous Justices at oral argument. 251 Thus, the
Fourth Amendment challenge in Jones included a difficult interaction
between the private-public space distinction and technological
advancement.
Before Jones, other courts had struggled with GPS
surveillance,2 52 and the one that had most thoroughly discussed the
2
1 a major opinion
issue came from New York. In People v. Weaverm
on New
surveillance
GPS
warrantless
down
struck
that
issued in 2009
York state constitutional grounds, the New York Court of Appeals
implicitly embraced mosaic theory. 254 In concluding that the GPS
248. See id. at 41-46 (Stevens, J., dissenting).

249. Id. at 38 (majority opinion); see also id. at 34-36 (emphasizing that home's privacy
must be protected against technological incursions).
250. See, e.g., Christian M. Halliburton, Letting Katz Out of the Bag: Cognitive
Freedom and Fourth Amendment Fidelity, 59 HASTINGS L.J. 309, 347-49 & nn.198, 207

(2007); supra note 201.
251. See supra notes 197-200 and accompanying text.
252. See supranotes 4-5 and accompanying text.
253. 909 N.E.2d 1195 (N.Y. 2009).
254. For a brief description of mosaic theory and a quick recitation of its origins, see
supra note 27 and accompanying text.
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installation and monitoring at issue violated the New York
Constitution's search and seizure protections because it was not
"compatible with any reasonable notion of personal privacy or
ordered liberty," the Court of Appeals wrote:
One need only consider what the police may learn, practically
effortlessly, from planting a single device. The whole of a
person's progress through the world, into both public and
private spatial spheres, can be charted and recorded over
lengthy periods possibly limited only by the need to change the
transmitting unit's batteries. Disclosed in the data retrieved
from the transmitting unit, nearly instantaneously with the
press of a button on the highly portable receiving unit, will be
trips the indisputably private nature of which takes little
imagination to conjure: trips to the psychiatrist, the plastic
surgeon, the abortion clinic, the AIDS treatment center, the
strip club, the criminal defense attorney, the by-the-hour motel,
the union meeting, the mosque, synagogue or church, the gay
bar and on and on. What the technology yields and records with
breathtaking quality and quantity is a highly detailed profile,
not simply of where we go, but by easy inference, of our
associations-political, religious, amicable and amorous, to
name only a few-and of the pattern of our professional and
avocational pursuits.2 ss
Writing for the majority in United States v. Maynard" (the D.C.
Circuit decision on which certiorari was granted in Jones), Judge
Ginsburg cited Weaver and embraced this mosaic theory in striking
down the police installation of the GPS device and its subsequent
monitoring."' As had Weaver, the D.C. Circuit in Maynard linked the
mosaic theory to prolonged surveillance:
Prolonged surveillance reveals types of information not
revealed by short-term surveillance, such as what a person does
repeatedly, what he does not do, and what he does ensemble.
These types of information can each reveal more about a
person than does any individual trip viewed in isolation.
Repeated visits to a church, a gym, a bar, or a bookie tell a
story not told by any single visit, as does one's not visiting any
of these places over the course of a month. The sequence of a
person's movements can reveal still more; a single trip to a
255. Weaver, 909 N.E.2d at 1199-1200 (relying upon N.Y. CONST. art. 1, § 12).
256. 615 F.3d 544 (D.C. Cir. 2010), cert. grantedsub nom. United States v. Jones, 131 S.
Ct. 3064 (2011).
257, Id. at 562; supra text accompanying note 26-30.
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gynecologist's office tells little about a woman, but that trip
followed a few weeks later by a visit to a baby supply store tells
a different story. A person who knows all of another's travels
can deduce whether he is a weekly church goer, a heavy
drinker, a regular at the gym, an unfaithful husband, an
outpatient receiving medical treatment, an associate of
particular individuals or political groups-and not just one such
fact about a person, but all such facts.?
The Maynard court elaborated in a footnote upon the importance of
the mosaic approach in Jones's prosecution, emphasizing that it was
the pattern of activity that was important to the government's case:
This case itself illustrates how the sequence of a person's
movements may reveal more than the individual movements of
which it is composed. Having tracked Jones's movements for a
month, the Government used the resulting pattern-not just
the location of a particular "stash house" or Jones's movements
on any one trip or even day-as evidence of Jones's
involvement in the cocaine trafficking business. The pattern the
Government would document with the GPS data was central to
its presentation of the case. . . .259
Maynard was particularly vulnerable to criticism for its reliance
on the mosaic theory and its emphasis upon prolonged surveillance
because both concepts are so indeterminate and present such
significant line-drawing problems. Are these concerns at issue only
with technological surveillance? Are they at issue with some forms of
technological surveillance but not others? How many individual
pieces of information need to be collected before the mosaic theory is
triggered? Is it possible for a surveillance to be sufficiently brief so as
to avoid triggering the mosaic theory or any other Fourth
Amendment protection? How brief is that? Do the respective
measures differ depending upon context, such as the governmental
interest justifying the search? If so, which interests matter? Severity
of the offense being investigated? Imminence of harm? Others? Do
the answers to these questions differ between criminal as opposed to
civil searches? Given these uncertainties, can the mosaic theory and
the concept of prolonged surveillance be fashioned so as to provide
sufficient guidance to governmental actors who wish to engage in
technological surveillance?
258. Maynard,615 F.3d at 562 (footnote omitted).
259. Id. at 562 n.*.
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Unsurprisingly, at oral argument in Jones the United States
emphasized these complexities:
I first want to address the suggestion that you could draw a
line somewhere between a month and a trip and have a
workable standard for police officers to use. Police officers use
a variety of investigative techniques which in the aggregate
produce an enormous amount of information. Pen registers,
trash pulls. They look at financial records. They conduct visual
surveillance. And under a principle of law that says 1 trip is
okay but 30 trips i[s] not, there is absolutely no guidance for law

enforcement ... .260

Later, in response to Justice Breyer's question about "tracking [the
people's] every movement over long periods of time" and identifying
a "reason and the principle that would reject that, but wouldn't also
reject 24 hours a day for 28 days," the United States described as
"intolerable" the "line-drawing problems that the Court would create
for itself" by following such a course.26 1
3. The Fourth Amendment Debate Over Mosaic Theory
Like the United States in Jones, mosaic theory critics prefer
clearer rules, especially those that already exist in Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence, such as the private-public space
distinction upon which Knotts is premised. 262 They critique, for
example, any attempt to identify arbitrary dividing lines between
brief warrantless GPS tracking, which would be free from Fourth
Amendment constraints under Justice Alito's approach in Jones, and
prolonged GPS tracking that triggers the mosaic theory, which
according to Justice Alito in Jones would be subject to Fourth
Amendment protections for "most offenses." 263
The validity of these critiques is debatable. One problem is that
the argument for applying the clear, historically well-established
private-public space distinction to a never-before-seen context
ignores the prospect that rules that worked well in the past might no
longer work given changed circumstances. This is of particular
260. Jones Transcript, supra note 2, at 14.
261. Id. at 24-25.
262. For a critical take on mosaic theory in the Fourth Amendment context, as well as
of Jones's apparent support for it, see Orin S. Kerr, The Mosaic Theory of the Fourth
Amendment, 110 MICH. L. REV. (forthcoming 2012).
263. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 964 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring); see supra
notes 205, 212-223 and accompanying text.
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concern when it comes to advancing technologies, with GPS tracking
being a prime example. Certainly it is true that police have not
needed warrants to engage in physical surveillance in public spaces.
This premise supported the United States's argument in Jones that it
did not need a warrant for GPS tracking because such technology
simply provides a different technique for engaging in the same
surveillance."
But GPS tracking is not just different in degree. For at least three
reasons, it is different in kind because GPS tracking can achieve
outcomes that physical surveillance never could. First, GPS tracking
allows potentially perpetual surveillance that is so pervasive and
detailed that the government would be unable to achieve the same
outcome with physical surveillance due to the possibility of detection
(which increases with the length of surveillance) and resourceconstraint issues (in terms of cost, personnel, and human error in
recordkeeping). Second, GPS tracking does not require persistent
human involvement or even occasional human oversight, as does
physical surveillance or even the beeper technology from Knotts and
Karo. Third, GPS tracking can access historical data predating the
actual start of an investigation and thus go back in time in a way that
physical surveillance cannot. The possibility of obtaining such
location data exists when the government relies upon pre-existing
GPS devices, such as those installed in vehicles or smartphones by
manufacturers or owners.2 65 At oral argument in Jones, Chief Justice
Roberts demonstrated that he was sensitive to these concerns:
That's a lot of work to follow the car. [The police have] to listen
to the beeper; when they lose it, they've got to call in the
helicopter. Here they just sit back in the station, and they-they
push a button whenever they want to find out where the car is.
They look at data from a month and find out everywhere it's
been in the past month.266
Justice Alito also expressed a similar concern at oral argument that
GPS tracking made information collection so easy for the government
as to render it different in kind rather than degree.267

264. See supra note 191 and accompanying text.
265. The third-party doctrine suggests that the government may be able to obtain GPS
data from third party service providers, such as GPS navigation services or wireless
carriers, without a warrant. See supra notes 12-16, 171-78 and accompanying text.
266. Jones Transcript, supra note 2, at 4.
267. See id. at 10-11.
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Another problem that mosaic theory critics often fail to
sufficiently account for is that simplistically applying the privatepublic space distinction dramatically restricts Fourth Amendment
protections, a point evident in the repeated references to 1984 in
cases involving GPS tracking. 68 A common critique of the mosaic
theory is that the point at which warrantless GPS tracking in public
spaces becomes unconstitutional-when it changes from being brief
(and allowed) to prolonged (and disallowed)-is arbitrary. Indeed,
the United States voiced this critique at oral argument in Jones.269
This critique is often accompanied by a strategic parry asserting that
the arbitrariness problem should be avoided by ignoring the 1984
concern until it is closer to reality. For instance, in Jones the United
States argued, "better that the Court should address the so-called
1984 scenarios if they come to pass, rather than using this case as a
vehicle for doing so." 27 0
This parry is intellectually disingenuous because the very logic of
the arbitrariness-avoidance argument-that difficult line-drawing
should be avoided now in favor of the private-public space
distinction-preordains the outcome so that line-drawing can never
occur and Fourth Amendment protections will never exist. This is
because the private-public space distinction leads to only one
outcome, regardless of whether the issue is "routine" GPS tracking as
in Jones, or dragnet and prolonged GPS use raising Orwellian
concerns. If line-drawing is to be avoided now on arbitrarinessavoidance grounds, no basis exists or can exist for imposing it later,
for the very reason that Chief Judge Sentelle of the D.C. Circuit so
pithily explained when he invoked the private-public space distinction
while dissenting from the denial of an en banc hearing in Jones: "The
reasonable expectation of privacy as to a person's movements on the
highway is ... zero. The sum of an infinite number of zero-value parts
is also zero."27 Justice Scalia acknowledged this logical endpoint at
oral argument in Jones, asserting that "[a] hundred times zero equals
zero. If ... there is no invasion of privacy for 1 day, there's no
invasion of privacy for a hundred days.... [I]f there's no invasion of
privacy, no matter how many days you do it, there's no invasion of
268. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
269. See supra text accompanying notes 260-61.
270. Jones Transcript, supra note 2, at 25.
271. United States v. Jones, 625 F.3d 766, 769 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (Sentelle, C.J.,
dissenting from denial of en banc hearing); see also supra text accompanying note 31
(quoting Judge Sentelle's language more fully).
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privacy." 272 Thus, avoiding line-drawing now, in favor of the privatepublic space distinction, leads right into the Orwellian nightmare. The
logical conclusion of the private-public space distinction is that it
preserves a Fourth Amendment zone of privacy only in private
homes, as Justice Ginsberg indicated at oral argument in Jones.273 The
Fourth Amendment would not protect individuals visiting a business
because businesses are public accommodations, open to all and thus
more like public than private spaces. The private-public space
distinction could deny Fourth Amendment protections to individuals
in private spaces that are part of the commons, a property status that
has become increasingly prevalent in urban areas.274 Sometimes, not
even the home is protected. The private-public space distinction, with
its link to the third-party doctrine, can deprive an individual of Fourth
Amendment protections that would otherwise exist in a private home
to the extent that the information or activities that the government
seeks to discover have been exposed to others.275 Consequently, the
constitutional choice in Jones was to begin the process of line-drawing
now, or quite possibly not at all.
Line-drawing could be accomplished while providing adequate
guidance to governmental actors. Though the United States argued
that line-drawing would be "intolerable" and could not be
implemented without depriving the government of needed
guidance,276 this is a strawman argument given that imposing a
warrant requirement for GPS tracking would provide a clear, brightline rule, which police could easily follow, and which would
meaningfully protect the public from this sort of surveillance by
regulating police discretion.
272. Jones Transcript, supra note 2, at 41.
273. See supra note 192.
274. See Matthew J. Kiefer, Privatizing Creationof the Public Realm: The Fruitsof New
York City's Incentive Zoning Ordinance, 28 B.C. ENvTL. AFF. L. REV. 637 (2001)
(reviewing JEROLD S. KAYDEN, PRIVATELY OWNED PUBLIC SPACE: THE NEW YORK
CITY EXPERIENCE (2000)). The most famous recent example of such a private commons
is Zuccotti Park in New York City, site of the original Occupy Wall Street movement. See
People v. Nunez, No. 2011 NY 082981, 2012 WL 1150124 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 2012) (denying
motion to dismiss charges of trespass, disorderly conduct, and obstruction of governmental
administration after private property owner withdrew its permission for public to be in
Zuccotti Park).
275. See supra notes 176-78. Moreover, even independent of the third-party doctrine
and its implications, the home's privacy protections are far from inviolate. Under certain
circumstances they can be infringed through warrantless and even suspicionless searches.
See, e.g., Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 880 (1987) (supervision of probationers);
Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309 (1971) (welfare home inspections).
276. Jones Transcript, supra note 2, at 24-25.
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Much more serious than the arbitrariness problem is the
institutional competency question of whether the judiciary or
legislature, or both, should do the line drawing. Certainly Congress
has a valid role to play in helping to define the lawful parameters of
electronic surveillance, and has repeatedly shown itself willing and
able to play that role.m7 Indeed, legislative attempts to regulate GPS
tracking, as well as its related cousin cellular tracking, have been
introduced.278 Undoubtedly, Congress can play a powerful role in
policing against the Orwellian state. Given that the dystopian
nightmare is defined by both pervasive and widespread surveillance,
majoritarianism holds the potential to act as a meaningful check
against it. 279 But these are insufficient reasons for the judiciary to
defer to the legislature on issues of technological surveillance.
I have elsewhere asserted that the judiciary has an especially
important role in guaranteeing Fourth Amendment protections.280
277. See, e.g., Federal Wiretap Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-22 (2006 & Supp. IV 2011);
Stored Communications Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701-12 (2006 & Supp. IV 2011); Pen Register
Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3121-27 (2006 & Supp. IV 2011); see also Ohm, Broken Promises,supra
note 19, at 1733-34 (describing how rise of computerization and massive government
databases spurred legislatures "to move to the forefront of privacy regulation").
278. At the federal level, Senators Leahy, Wyden, and Franken have all proposed such
bills. Electronic Communications Privacy Act Amendments Act of 2011, S. 1011, 112th
Cong. (1st Sess. 2011) (Leahy Bill); Geolocational Privacy and Surveillance Act, S. 1212,
112th Cong. (1st Sess. 2011) (Wyden Bill); Location Privacy Act of 2011, S. 1223, 112th
Cong. (1st Sess. 2011) (Franken Bill). Several states have also intfoduced such legislation,
often based upon the Wyden model. S. 761, 2011 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2011); The Interception
and Disclosure of Geolocation Information Protection Act of 2011, H.R. 674, 151st Gen.
Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2012) (mirrors Wyden Bill); S. 360, 117th Gen. Assemb., 2d Sess.
(Ind. 2012); An Act Relative to location tracking by electronic communication devices,
2012),
Sess.
(N.H.
H.R.
1675,
162d
http://www.gencourt.state.nh.us//legislation/2012/HB1675.html; Geolocation Information
Protection Act, H.R. 2861, 53d Legis., 2d Reg. Sess. (Okla. 2012) (mirrors Wyden Bill).
279. At oral argument in Jones, Justice Scalia was the only member of the Court who
vocally and dismissively discounted Orwellian concerns, premising his dismissiveness upon
majoritarian safeguards. During an exchange between Justice Sotomayor and the United
States in which she raised the hypothetical of a government-installed GPS device "on
every car in the nation," Justice Scalia interjected, declaiming, "Don't we have any
legislatures out there that could stop this stuff?" Jones Transcript, supra note 2, at 26.
Later, addressing prolonged surveillance, he stated, "[It may be unreasonable police
conduct, and we can handle that with laws," and, with respect to line-drawing to establish
the allowed length of surveillance, noted, "Of course, a legislature can take care of this."
Id. at 41, 51. Justice Scalia directly challenged Jones's counsel on this point, asking, "Why
isn't this precisely the kind of a problem that you should rely upon legislatures to take care
of?" Id. at 52. Jones's counsel had perhaps his best rhetorical moment during oral
argument when he answered in part, "In this particular case I could probably give you 535
reasons why not to go to Congress." Id.
280. See Arcila, Death of Suspicion, supra note 165, at 1338.
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This is particularly true in the context of electronic surveillance, if
only because Congress cannot keep pace with technological advances.
Moreover, even in instances when Congress might timely
demonstrate an interest in intervening, as it arguably has with GPS
there is a world of difference between expressed
tracking,'
legislative interest and actual legislative accomplishment. Other
important concerns are that the legislative process is vulnerable to
capture, and that executive processes can sacrifice minority interests,
such that they may fail to impartially protect the public. These
instances can easily occur in contexts where the Fourth Amendment
is implicated, such as the targeting of religious minorities (think about
national security concerns and actual practices with regard to Muslim
communities in the past decade since 9/11282) or ethnic minorities
(think about search practices, including warrantless home raids, used
in immigration enforcement283 ). In light of these concerns, the
judiciary's special role in protecting Fourth Amendment rights is
especially magnified given that there will often be an interest in using
technological surveillance against groups that are disfavored,
unpopular, or in the minority. Such groups can be expected to rarely,
if ever, have their interests adequately protected through the political
process.
281. See supra note 278 and accompanying text.
282. For instance, after 9/11 New York City instituted a suspicionless bag search
program in its subway system, which was upheld against a facial challenge in part based
upon the city's representation that randomness is assured, and invidious discrimination
avoided, through a pre-determined selection rate. MacWade v. Kelly, 460 F.3d 260 (2d Cir.
2006). Jangir Sultan, a thirty-two year old native New Yorker of Kashmiri descent, sued
the city after having been stopped and searched twenty-one times since the program
started in 2005; he alleged that the chance of his having been legitimately stopped and
searched to that extent under the program was about one in 165 million. Complaint at 1, 3,
available at
2009),
(E.D.N.Y.
CIV 698
09
No.
Kelly,
v.
Sultan
http://www.nyclu.org/files/SultanvCityofNewYorkComplaint2-19-09-0.pdf. New York City
settled the case by paying $10,000 in damages, plus attorney fees, after twice rejecting
Sultan's offers to forego damages in exchange for monitoring of the program. Sultan v.
Kelly, et al. (Challenging the NYPD's Subway Bag Search Program), NYCLU,
http://www.nyclu.org/case/sultan-v-kelly-et-al-challenging-nypds-subway-bag-searchprogram (last visited Nov. 16, 2012).
New York City has also been embroiled in another major controversy after it was
discovered that its police department instituted a secret spying program targeting Muslim
communities in and around New York City, with a focus on New Jersey. See Hassan v.
New York, No. 2:12-cv-03401 (D.N.J. filed June 6, 2012). For a series of Associated Press
news reports about the controversy see AP's Probe into NYPD Intelligence Operations,
AP, http://ap.org/Index/AP-In-The-News/NYPD (last visited Nov. 16,2012).
283. See, e.g., Argueta v. U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, 643 F.3d 60 (3d
Cir. 2011); Aguilar v. Immigration and Customs Enforcement Div. of the U.S., 811 F.
Supp. 2d 803 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).
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Given the need for judicial involvement, it was comforting that in
Jones all nine Justices agreed that the Fourth Amendment applied to
GPS use, with the happy likelihood that the judiciary will play an
important role in overseeing the use of this surveillance technique.
On this point, Justice Alito's and Justice Sotomayor's concurring
opinions provided important guidance about applying Katz's privacy
model to technological surveillance. (Justice Scalia's approach has
nothing to say on this point given that he resolved the case on
historical grounds, with concerns about modern technology playing
no role.)
In light of Justice Alito's willingness to reject the broad reading
of the private-public space distinction as exemplified in Knotts,11 the
question of his motivation becomes crucial. A good guess is that he
wanted to assure that the Fourth Amendment keeps pace with
technological change. He did not say so explicitly, but there is ample
support for this conclusion. For example, his concern at oral
argument about the ease with which the government can amass
information using advanced technology is suggestive. He stated:
[I]t seems to me the heart of the problem that's presented by
this case and will be presented by other cases involving new
technology is that in the pre-computer, pre-Internet age, much
of the privacy-I would say most of the privacy-that people
enjoyed was not the result of legal protections or constitutional
protections; it was the result simply of the difficulty of traveling
up
information.
and
gathering
around
But with computers, it's now so simple to amass an
enormous amount of information about people that consists of
things that could have been observed on the streets,
information that was made available to the public.
His comments are interesting in that they at once suggest both a
constrained past view of Fourth Amendment protections and perhaps
a need to expand those protections to account for technological
advances. He pursued his suggestion in his Jones concurrence,
writing:
In the pre-computer age, the greatest protections of privacy
were neither constitutional nor statutory, but practical.
284. See supra Part II.B.1.
285. Jones Transcript, supra note 2, at 10-11. As set forth above, Chief Justice Roberts
expressed similar concerns during oral argument in Jones. See supra text accompanying
note 266. This raises the intriguing prospect that he might have some sympathy for Justice
Alito's approach despite joining only Justice Scalia's majority opinion.
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Traditional surveillance for any extended period of time was
difficult and costly and therefore rarely undertaken. The
surveillance at issue in this case-constant monitoring of the
location of a vehicle for four weeks-would have required a
large team of agents, multiple vehicles, and perhaps aerial
assistance. Only an investigation of unusual importance could
have justified such an expenditure of law enforcement
resources. Devices like the one used in the present case,
however, make long-term monitoring relatively easy and
cheap.28 6
Justice Alito's solution for adapting Fourth Amendment
principles to new and evolving technology, at least in the context of
GPS tracking, was to add his new temporal limit to Katz's objective
privacy prong. In doing so, he chose to use time as a proxy for a more
diffuse set of concerns that technology raises in the search context.
One such concern is ease of access to information, which could be
measured in myriad ways such as work hours, required endurance, or
resource intensity. Another concern is whether technology literally
makes information gathering possible that would otherwise be
impossible. The availability of historical GPS data is a good example
of this possibility. Another concern is the volume of information
obtained. Rather than descend into the complexity that would arise
by considering some or all of these factors, he preferred to take a
more generalized approach by applying a temporal metric.
Justice Alito's reasoning is novel in that it suggests that the
judiciary has a special role in assuring Fourth Amendment
protections-to act as a bulwark against the government being able to
manipulate privacy expectations-though the Court itself opened the
door to such manipulation. The prospect of such manipulation has
long been a critique of Katz and its importation of a privacy standard
into Fourth Amendment search jurisprudence. Indeed, Justice Alito
recognizes the prospect of such manipulation. For example, he points
out that numerous developing technologies-such as widespread
camera surveillance, "automatic toll collection systems," and cellular
and GPS tracking-"will continue to shape the average person's
expectations about the privacy of his or her daily movements."287
Unstated but implicit in Justice Alito's concurring opinion is that the
government can also leverage the third-party doctrine to take
286. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 963-64 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring)
(footnote omitted).
287. Id. at 963.

2012]

GPS TRACKING

61

advantage of lessened objective privacy expectations. This is the point
he sought to make when he wrote in his concurring opinion that
"technology can change" objective privacy expectations. 88 He
explained that:
Dramatic technological change may lead to periods in which
popular expectations are in flux and may ultimately produce
significant changes in popular attitudes. New technology may
provide increased convenience or security at the expense of
privacy, and many people may find the tradeoff worthwhile.
And even if the public does not welcome the diminution of
privacy that new technology entails, they may eventually
reconcile themselves to this development as inevitable.8 9
Justice Alito's view turns the old critique of Katz on its head.
Instead of the privacy concept being a weakness in the Supreme
Court's Fourth Amendment canon-raising the prospect of
governmental manipulation of the public's objective privacy
expectations and thus constituting a threat to the public's protections
from governmental searches-it now becomes a strength, a device
that both justifies and promises a strong judicial role in assuring
Fourth Amendment protections.
There is an odd paternalism to Justice Alito's approach. In his
view, the problem is not an overreaching government or a judiciary
that has improperly formulated Fourth Amendment law, but
ourselves and our overly elastic approach to privacy. As in all
complex dynamics, there is an undeniable grain of truth in Justice
Alito's presentation. It remains difficult to argue that Facebook is
such a necessity that it is unfair to impose a tradeoff in our privacy
expectations should we choose to disclose our personal information
to it. But perhaps we have already reached a point where that
argument works with Google or other Internet search engines given
the central role that Internet access and information has in our
modern lives. In any case, such arguments certainly fall flat in
contexts like banking or telephonic communications, where it hardly
seems fair to treat our willingness to interact with third-party service
providers as knowing and voluntary sacrifices to our objective privacy
expectations, though this is the premise underlying application of the
third-party doctrine in such contexts. 290 Despite this significant
288. Id. at 962.
289. Id. (footnote omitted).
290. See supra notes 171-75 and accompanying text.
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fictional premise, which is a Supreme Court creation, Justice Alito
characterizes us as the problem, and implicitly offers that we should
apparently take comfort that he and the judiciary will be there to
protect us from ourselves.
Unlike Justice Alito, Justice Sotomayor was more intellectually
honest on this point, writing that:
Perhaps, as Justice Alito notes, some people may find the
"tradeoff" of privacy for convenience "worthwhile," or come to
accept this "diminution of privacy" as "inevitable," and perhaps
not. I for one doubt that people would accept without
complaint the warrantless disclosure to the Government of a
list of every Web site they had visited in the last week, or
month, or year.291
Consequently, she was willing to suggest that the problem is not us,
but Supreme Court precedent, which led to her explicit willingness to
"reconsider" the third-party doctrine. 292 But, as no other Justice is yet
willing to join Justice Sotomayor at this point, all we can do is take
solace that Justice Alito-and Justices Ginsberg, Breyer, and Kagan,
who all joined his concurrence-will stand as bulwarks against our
own diminished privacy expectations in a technologically advanced
world, which in Justice Alito's view we impose upon ourselves.
The positions that Justices Alito and Sotomayor took are also
important for what they imply about the Supreme Court's views on
mosaic theory. Neither of them use the term, but they implicitly
indicate varying degrees of willingness to accept mosaic theory as at
least part of Fourth Amendment surveillance law.
Justice Alito's thoughts on mosaic theory are implicit in the new
temporal distinction he applies when determining if an objective
expectation of privacy exists. It appears that, in his view, what makes
brief GPS monitoring not a "search" under the Fourth Amendment is
that it reveals a smaller and thus acceptable amount of information,
such that no objective expectation of privacy is infringed.9 By
contrast, Justice Alito suggests that what makes prolonged GPS
monitoring a Fourth Amendment "search" is that it will reveal more
information, such that an objective expectation of privacy is
infringed. 9 If this is correct, Justice Alito is, even if unconsciously,
291.
292.
293.
294.

Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 957 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (citation omitted).
See supra text accompanying note 227.
See Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 964 (Alito, J., concurring).
See id.
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endorsing a version of mosaic theory, as he is drawing Fourth
Amendment distinctions based upon the amount of information
collected, rather than through some other measure such as the type of
search activity at issue. Importantly, at least three other Justices
(Justices Ginsberg, Breyer, and Kagan, who joined Justice Alito's
concurrence) presumably agree with this implicit embrace of mosaic
theory and its incorporation into Fourth Amendment law, as none of
them wrote separately to indicate any qualms about or disagreements
with it.
In her separate concurrence, Justice Sotomayor even more
clearly endorsed the use of mosaic theory in the Fourth Amendment.
Citing to and even parenthetically quoting from that portion of the
New York Court of Appeals's Weaver decision that relied upon
mosaic theory, 295 she pointed to the GPS-enabled capability of
developing a "precise, comprehensive record of a person's public
movements that reflects a wealth of detail about her familial, political,
professional, religious, and sexual associations."' She went on to
specify that she would ask "whether people reasonably expect that
their movements will be recorded and aggregated in a manner that
enables the Government to ascertain, more or less at will, their
political and religious beliefs, sexual habits, and so on."2 97 These
statements demonstrate that, more than any other Justice, she would
consider the amount and extent of information obtained through
surveillance, and thus looks favorably upon mosaic theory in the
context of Fourth Amendment surveillance law.
Justice Scalia is no fan of the mosaic theory, and by extension it
appears that the three Justices who joined him (Chief Justice Roberts
and Justices Kennedy and Thomas) are not either. Justice Scalia
derided the mosaic theory implications of Justice Alito's temporal
distinction, pointing to the difficulty of the line-drawing that
inevitably follows.9 8
Nonetheless, the support evident in Justice Alito's and Justice
Sotomayor's concurring opinions for some iteration of the mosaic
theory may have significant implications. They have added their
voices to Weaver's embrace of mosaic theory in a Fourth Amendment

295. See supratext accompanying notes 253-55.
296. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 955 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
297. Id. at 956.
298. See id. at 954 (majority opinion) (pointing to the difficulty in distinguishing
between a four-week-long investigation versus a two-day or six-month-long investigation).
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context. 299 After Jones, momentum may be building on this point, as
the South Dakota Supreme Court has added its support as well.3 *
III. NEW QUESTIONS AFTER JONES

The complexity of the Jones opinions leaves open numerous
issues for future exploration and clarification. I flag some of these
issues below, pointing out uncertainties that result from Jones, as well
as possible avenues along which Fourth Amendment jurisprudence
may develop.
FourthAmendment Constitutionalityof GPS Searches
Jones decided only that the GPS tracking at issue was subject to
Fourth Amendment strictures. It did not say anything about what
those strictures are, or should be. The Supreme Court did not, for
instance, follow its own examples from Katz v. United Statess1 or
Kyllo v. United States.3 02 In each of these cases, the Court ruled that
the challenged surveillance was not only a "search" under the Fourth
Amendment, but also clarified that a warrant was presumptively
required. 03 In contrast, the Jones Court stopped after ruling that the
GPS tracking was a Fourth Amendment "search." It did not impose a
A.

299. For a discussion of the mosaic theory in Weaver, see supra notes 252-55 and
accompanying text.
300. The South Dakota Supreme Court appeared to embrace mosaic theory when it
invalidated an instance of prolonged warrantless GPS tracking on Fourth Amendment
grounds, in part based upon Justice Alito's privacy rationale:
Current GPS technology is uniquely intrusive in the wealth of highly-detailed
information it gathers. The GPS device used in this case continuously transmitted
the geographic location of Zahn's vehicle to a computer at the Brown County
Sheriffs Department. It enabled officers to not only determine his speed,
direction, and geographic location within five to ten feet at any time, but to also
use the recorded information to discover patterns in the whole of his movements
for nearly a month.
... When the use of a GPS device enables police to gather a wealth of highlydetailed information about an individual's life over an extended period of time, its
use violates an expectation of privacy that society is prepared to recognize as
reasonable. The use of a GPS device to monitor Zahn's activities for twenty-six
days was therefore a Fourth Amendment search under the Katz "reasonable
expectation of privacy" test.
State v. Zahn, 2012 SD 19, $ 27-28, 812 N.W.2d 490, 498-99 (S.D. 2012) (emphasis added)
(footnote omitted) (citation omitted).
301. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
302. 533 U.S. 27 (2001).
303. See id. at 33-40; Katz, 389 U.S. at 351-59 (1967).
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presumptive warrant requirement for such GPS searches, and said
nothing about what conditions would make such a search
constitutional under the Fourth Amendment.
Thus, substantial uncertainty continues to exist as to the
conditions under which such GPS searches are constitutional. Most
likely, such GPS tracking will be subject to one or more of the
familiar Fourth Amendment requirements of a warrant, probable
cause, or perhaps merely reasonable suspicion, and perhaps also one
or more exceptions that are generally likely to fall under the exigency
rubric. Any of these options are available. They exist in other areas of
Fourth Amendment law and can easily be incorporated into the GPS
context. Courts could reason that the amount of location data that
GPS provides is so detailed that the highest procedural protections of
a search warrant should be required. Or courts could analogize to the
automobile exception and latch onto a vehicle's mobility to reason
that a warrant might be too onerous,3 0 and thus require only
probable cause before a GPS device is installed on one and
monitored. Or courts could defer to executive assertions that even
probable cause is too onerous of a standard,"o and instead analogize
to Terry v. Ohio306 to impose a mere reasonable suspicion standard. In
Jones, the United States argued that even a reasonable suspicion
standard was too onerous, 07 and a court that is particularly troubled
by national security concerns, for example, could carve out some basis
upon which GPS tracking could be used as a matter of executive
discretion, such as by invoking an exigency exception to the Fourth
Amendment.
Thus, despite Jones's importance, much work remains to be done
to sort out the doctrinal consequences of its ruling that GPS tracking
is covered by the Fourth Amendment.
Offense-Specific Fourth Amendment Standards
Perhaps the most innovative and surprising part of Justice Alito's
concurring opinion is his incorporation of an offense-specific criteria
into the formula for determining whether an objective privacy
expectation exists under Katz. He wrote that "the use of longer term
GPS monitoring in investigations of most offenses impinges on
B.

304. See California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 390 (1985); Carroll v. United States, 267
U.S. 132, 153 (1925).
305. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
306. 392 U.S. 1 (1967).
307. See supra note 48.
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expectations of privacy," 0 s and then expanded on this point,
declaring that "[w]e also need not consider whether prolonged GPS
monitoring in the context of investigations involving extraordinary
offenses would similarly intrude on a constitutionally protected
sphere of privacy. In such cases, long-term tracking might have been
mounted using previously available techniques. "309 Given the novelty
of this new factor, which may well be in tension with a concurring
opinion in Katz itself,310 lawyers and judges are guaranteed to be
interested in it, but also to struggle with it. Consequently, it is
worthwhile to give further thought to what Justice Alito was seeking
to accomplish, and how.
The one thing that is clear about this offense-specific standard,
and bears emphasizing, is that it provides an exception to Justice
Alito's temporal limit. The initial standard he applies to determining
whether GPS surveillance violates an objective privacy expectation is
whether it was brief or prolonged." Though Justice Alito sees
prolonged GPS surveillance as generally violating objective privacy
expectations, he uses his offense-specific standard as an exception,
depriving his temporal limit of the status of a categorical rule.
Another important clue about how to apply his offense-specific
standard emerges in his language that, in the context of extraordinary
offenses, "long-term tracking might have been mounted using
previously available techniques."3 12 This provides guidance as to his
thinking because he had earlier emphasized that, prior to
technological advances, practical resource constraints had limited the
amount and intrusiveness of governmental searches, with the
government choosing to make special efforts only in rare and
significant cases.
308. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 964 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring) (emphasis
added).
309. Id. (emphasis added).
310. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360 (1967) (Douglas, J., concurring)
("There is, so far as I understand constitutional history, no distinction under the Fourth
Amendment between types of crimes.... [T]he Fourth Amendment draws no lines
between various substantive offenses.").
311. See supra text accompanying note 205.
312. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 964 (Alito, J., concurring).
313. Id. at 963-64 (explaining that "[i]n the pre-computer age... [t]raditional
surveillance for any extended period of time was difficult and costly and therefore rarely
undertaken.... Only an investigation of unusual importance could have justified such an
expenditure of law enforcement resources."). For the unedited version of Justice Alito's
language, see supra text accompanying note 286. See also supra text accompanying note
285 (reciting similar point Justice Alito made during oral argument in Jones).
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These passages are revealing, and what they reveal is surprising.
Contrary to what one might think upon first encountering Justice
Alito's "most offenses" language, he is not using the phrase to suggest
category-based distinctions between offenses. For example, he does
not seem to be suggesting that Fourth Amendment distinctions will
be drawn as to whether any particular governmental investigatory
technique is a "search" depending upon whether the offense being
investigated involves serial murder or organized crime on the one
hand, or shoplifting or petty theft on the other. Rather, he seems to
be suggesting that whether a Fourth Amendment "search" has
occurred depends upon how important the government thinks the
offense being investigated is, regardless of whether it is murder,
organized crime, shoplifting, or petty theft. Crucially, the standard
Justice Alito suggests for assessing governmental importance seems
to be the government's willingness to devote resources to the
investigation, given his language about whether "long-term tracking
might have been mounted using previously available techniques."314
Thus, his offense-specific standard is really a resource-intensity
standard.
There are two remarkable things about this offense-specific
standard. The first is probably not too concerning, but the second is
potentially quite alarming. First, it is only a proxy for the real factor
of governmental importance. This is not problematic if it is an
accurate proxy, and given the quotidian reality of governmental
resource constraints, we can expect that it often will be. On the other
hand, there is some reason for concern even here because the
government has a unique and unmatched ability to bring essentially
unlimited resources to problems it wishes to concentrate upon, and
this is certainly true in criminal law enforcement and civil
proceedings, each of which involves investigative efforts.
Second-and this is the troubling part-it is a measure over
which the government has unilateral control. Thus, there is a twist
here that has the potential of allowing incursions into Fourth
Amendment protections because the government can manipulate this
factor. To do so, it need only be willing to throw some unusual
amount of resources at an investigation in order to create a record
that will allow it to argue that it had deemed the investigation of
unusual importance, thus satisfying Justice Alito's "extraordinary
offenses" standard.
314. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 964 (Alito, J., concurring).
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Exactly what efforts must be made are unclear, though Justice
Alito suggests that a willingness to engage in a more thorough
investigation than usual while "using previously available techniques"
would be a reliable indicator. Combined with Knotts's interpretative
approach, which focused on what the government could have done,
rather than upon what it actually did,315 this seems to suggest that, if
the government can show that it was willing to throw sufficient
traditional resources into an investigation such that it could have,
would have, or did gain a similar amount of information as it could
have, would have, or did using advanced technology, then the Court
may well hold that objective privacy expectations are not infringed.
The extent to which such a holding is dependent upon whether or not
advanced technology may have played a singular role remains wholly
uncertain.
Though Justice Alito does not seem to be thinking about his
offense-specific distinction in terms of categorical distinctions
between offenses, do not be surprised if some courts apply it that way.
The reason why this seems likely to happen is that it provides a ready
means of mollifying government claims that GPS surveillance must be
available free of any probable cause requirement. (The United States
made this very claim during oral argument in Jones."6 ) In this view,
GPS is a powerful investigative technique that must remain available
as a means of developing probable cause, and applying a categorical
distinction between certain types of offenses provides an easy
measuring line. If this happens, hopefully it will occur only on a caseby-case basis and will be applied narrowly, such as by applying an
exigency and immediacy requirement to "extraordinary offenses." In
this manner, the offense-specific distinction might be cabined to apply
extremely rarely, such as in high-stakes terrorism investigations, so
that this exception does not swallow the Jones "search" ruling.
C.

Voting Pattern

1. Why Only Five Votes for Clarifying Katz's Privacy-VersusProperty Ambiguity?
An interesting mystery in Jones is why Justices Ginsberg, Breyer,
and Kagan-all of whom joined Justice Alito's privacy-based
concurring opinion-refused to join Justice Scalia's property-centric
315. See supra text accompanying notes 243-44.
316. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
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opinion of the Court. Justice Scalia (with Justice Sotomayor's help as
the fifth vote) clearly and cleanly established that Katz merely
supplemented a property-based theory of the Fourth Amendment
with a privacy-based one, with the important consequence that it is
now certain that either theory provides a basis for seeking
constitutional search protections."' In light of the ambiguity about
this point that had existed since Katz, Justice Scalia's approach holds
the promise of expanding Fourth Amendment protections by
doubling the conceptual bases upon which such safeguards can be
claimed. Justice Scalia, for one, certainly sees it that way, reportedly
stating during a speech that "[m]y [Jones] opinion didn't repudiate
Katz. It is in addition .. ." 318 He went on to describe his approach as
31
"much more defendant friendly."m
One might have expected Justices Ginsberg, Breyer, and Kagan
to welcome the chance to expand the bases upon which Fourth
Amendment protections might be sought, and thus their refusal to do
so by refraining from joining Justice Scalia's majority opinion may be
significant. Possibly, they refrained because they did not agree with
resolving the case through application of a property-centric trespass
theory, as Justice Scalia did. Perhaps they did not join Justice Scalia
because they did not feel that his trespass theory could intelligibly
resolve the case while respecting the language from United States v.
Karo320 that a mere trespass, in and of itself, does not amount to a
Fourth Amendment violation.321 Or perhaps their reticence stemmed
from a reluctance to support such a historical approach to Fourth
Amendment analysis (though they could have clarified such a qualm
through a concurrence).32 2 Or perhaps some other reason motivated
them.
317. See United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 952 (2012); supra note 79 and
accompanying text.
318. Weiss, supra note 112, at 59.
319. Id.
320. 468 U.S. 705 (1984).
321. Id. at 712-13 ("At most, there was a technical trespass on the space occupied by
the beeper. The existence of a physical trespass is only marginally relevant to the question
of whether the Fourth Amendment has been violated, however, for an actual trespass is
neither necessary nor sufficient to establish a constitutional violation."). Justice Scalia
resolved this tension by adopting a two-part property-based standard that requires (1) a
physical invasion sufficient to constitute a trespass, (2) for the purpose of obtaining
information. See supra note 111 and accompanying text. Thus, his Jones standard requires
more than a mere trespass to establish a Fourth Amendment violation, and hence remains
consistent with this aspect of Karo.
322. At least with regard to Justices Ginsberg and Breyer, this possibility is
undermined by their having previously joined opinions calling for historical primacy in
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In any event, they did not choose to support the part of Justice
Scalia's opinion that resolved the Katz ambiguity by clarifying that
Katz supplemented, but did not replace, a property-centric Fourth
Amendment. Their choices might be monumentally important
because they leave Justice Scalia's resolution of this Katz ambiguity
vulnerable to the loss of any single vote. They had an opportunity to
do more to safeguard this portion of Justice Scalia's opinion from
potential abrogation, and thus eliminate any uncertainty on this point,
by specifying their support for it through a separate concurring
opinion in which some or all of them could have joined. But, they did
not. If they indeed supported Justice Scalia's interpretation of Katz
on this issue, this is an unfortunate lost chance because it leaves only
a bare five-Justice majority supporting his proposition.323
2. To What Extent Does Justice Sotomayor Disagree with Justice
Alito's Concurrence?
The extent to which Justice Sotomayor disagrees with Justice
Alito's privacy-based approach is a critical question. This is because
Justice Scalia's competing approach will have a narrower field of
application. For example, it has no apparent applicability to the many
forms of surveillance that do not involve physical trespass, such as
other forms of location tracking or data collection.324 Thus, the extent
to which Justice Sotomayor is willing to provide a fifth vote for
Justice Alito's broader, privacy-based approach is crucially important.
Justice Sotomayor's concurring opinion indicates that she has
important areas of agreement, but suggests that she has some
significant disagreements as well.
In terms of agreement, she shared Justice Alito's concern that it
was important to be open to extending Fourth Amendment
protections even in the absence of physical intrusion, which "is now
unnecessary to many forms of surveillance."325 To address such
instances, she indicated a general willingness to apply Katz's privacy
approach, and specifically agreed with Justice Alito that, "at the very

Fourth Amendment analysis. See Virginia v. Moore, 553 U.S. 164, 168 (2008); Wilson v.
Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927, 931 (1995). Justice Breyer, however, has qualified his support. See
Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 307-08 (1999) (Breyer, J., concurring).
323. See supra text accompanying note 120-21 (explaining that Justice Sotomayor
provided the crucial fifth vote on this point).
324. See supra notes 13-16 and accompanying text.
325. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 955 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
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least, 'longer term GPS monitoring in investigations of most offenses
impinges on expectations of privacy.' "326
The key here is divining the meaning of her pregnant caveat "at
the very least." Happily, she provided useful guidance. First, she
indicated a resistance to the exception that Justice Alito carved out
for brief GPS monitoring, at least to the extent that such brief
monitoring could threaten privacy interests under a mosaic theory or
could "chill[] associational and expressive freedoms."3 27 She disagreed
with Justice Alito's suggestion that the government should be given
the power to evade Fourth Amendment search restrictions-for
either brief or prolonged GPS tracking-if it considered the
investigation sufficiently important, as evidenced by the extent of
traditional investigative resources the government was willing to
commit.32 8 She expressed a willingness to more directly confront the
crucial discretion question in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, 29
stating that she "would also consider the appropriateness of
entrusting to the Executive, in the absence of any oversight from a
coordinate branch, a tool so amenable to misuse, especially in light of
the Fourth Amendment's goal to curb arbitrary exercises of police
power to and prevent 'a too permeating police surveillance.' "330
Finally, she seems much more willing to significantly reform Fourth
Amendment law by revisiting the fundamentals of third-party
doctrine.333
D. Relevance of Technology in "GeneralPublic Use"
In Kyllo v. United States, 332 the Supreme Court invalidated the
warrantless use of a thermal imager to search a home from its
exterior, and in doing so placed importance upon the imager being a
piece of advanced technology that was not in "general public use."
326. Id. (emphasis added) (quoting id. at 964 (Alito, J., concurring)).
327. Id. at 955-56.
328. See id. at 956 ("1 do not regard as dispositive the fact that the Government might
obtain the fruits of GPS monitoring through lawful conventional surveillance
techniques."). For a review of Justice Alito's views on this subject, see Part III.B.
329. I have elsewhere argued that the Supreme Court has insufficiently attended to this
issue. See Arcila, Death of Suspicion, supra note 165, at 1326.
330. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 956 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (quoting United States v. Di
Re, 332 U.S. 581, 595 (1948)).
331. See supra text accompanying note 227.
332. 533 U.S. 27 (2001).
333. Id. at 34, 40. The majority and dissenting opinions disagreed about whether
thermal imagers were in general public use. Compare id. at 34 ("We think that obtaining
by sense-enhancing technology any information regarding the interior of the home that
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Kyllo thus suggested that, when government uses technology to
search, one factor in the Fourth Amendment calculus is whether the
public has access to the technology and has sufficiently incorporated
it into daily life.
Though Jones involved GPS, which is certainly an advanced
technology, no opinion gave any consideration to the Kyllo generalpublic-use factor. This omission occurred even though Jones agreed
with Kyllo that the Court's duty is to " 'assur[e] preservation of that
degree of privacy against government that existed when the Fourth
Amendment was adopted.' "334 This passage appears in Kyllo
immediately following the declaration that the thermal imager "is not
in general public use.""' Nonetheless, Jones ignored the generalpublic-use factor. Jones's omission of the general-public-use factor
may be due to a problem identified in the Kyllo dissent:
[T]he contours of [the majority's) new rule are uncertain
because its protection apparently dissipates as soon as the
relevant technology is "in general public use." Yet how much
use is general public use is not even hinted at.... [Plutting
aside its lack of clarity, this criterion is somewhat perverse
because it seems likely that the threat to privacy will grow,
rather than recede, as the use of intrusive equipment becomes
more readily available. 36
This critique is powerfully applicable to GPS, a technology that is
undoubtedly in general public use because it is ubiquitously installed
in vehicles and smartphones, and is actively used by the public, and
has been for many years.
Consequently, had this Kyllo factor been treated as dispositive in
Jones, it appears that not a single Justice would have been able to rule
as he or she did-in favor of Jones and against the United States. The
dramatic impact that this Kyllo factor would have had-combined
could not otherwise have been obtained without physical intrusion into a constitutionally
protected area... constitutes a search-at least where (as here) the technology in
question is not in general public use.") (internal quotation marks and citation omitted),
and id. at 40 ("Where, as here, the Government uses a device that is not in general public
use .... ), with id. at 47 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("Yet how much use is general public use
is not even hinted at by the Court's opinion, which makes the somewhat doubtful
assumption that the thermal imager used in this case does not satisfy that criterion."), and
id. 47 n.5 (pointing out that the device at issue "is just an 800-number away from being
rented from 'half a dozen national companies' by anyone who wants one").
334. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 950 (quoting Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 34).
335. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 34.
336. Id. at 47 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
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with its complete failure to make any appearance whatsoeverpotentially calls into question its continued viability.
E.

New Standing Law(?) and Third-PartyConsent

A reason for caution before introducing a new legal test is that
unintended consequences may arise, and the implications that Justice
Scalia's new trespassory test might have on Fourth Amendment
standing may be one example. Already, one post-Jones decision has
suggested that the new trespassory test changes standing law. In
United States v. Hanna," Magistrate Torres reasoned that standing

exists to litigate the trespassory theory only when "one's own
personal 'effects' have been trespassed," which can be shown through
ownership or exclusive use.338 He derived this new standing test by
emphasizing that Justice Scalia had "expressly noted that Jones was
the exclusive driver of the vehicle, and that if he was not the owner he
had at least the property rights of a bailee,"a33 and that Jones had
" 'possessed the Jeep at the time the Government trespassorily
inserted the information-gathering device.' "340
In Hanna, police, lacking a warrant, had installed a GPS device
when a vehicle was parked in a public lot.3 41 They monitored the GPS
device on only one discrete occasion about a week later, to locate the
vehicle, which at the time was empty and in a parking complex.34 2
Because neither of the two defendants seeking suppression had
owned the vehicle (another co-conspirator owned it), and the only
GPS location data police used was of the parked vehicle's location
when it was empty and therefore "not in possession of anyone,"
Magistrate Torres recommended that the suppression motions be
denied for lack of Fourth Amendment standing.3 43
This take on standing under the trespassory test seems plausible
(though it appears too stringent, as I detail below) given the
traditional Fourth Amendment standing test, which requires that a
defendant's own Fourth Amendment interests be implicated before
standing is granted."* In a pre-Katz case, which seems an appropriate
337. No. 11-20678-CR, 2012 WL 279435 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 30,2012).
338. Id. at *3.
339. Id. (quoting Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 949 n.2) (internal quotation marks omitted).
340. Id. (quoting Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 952).
341. Id. at *1.
342. Id. at *2.
343. Id. at *3-5.
344. See Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 261 (1960), overruled by United States v.
Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83 (1980).
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touchstone given that the Jones trespassory test resurrects the preKatz property-centric view of the Fourth Amendment, the Supreme
Court had defined standing as requiring that the litigant be the
"victim" whose rights were violated ("'aggrieved by an unlawful
search and seizure' ") and "against whom the search was directed."3 45
Magistrate Torres's implicit suggestion that at most only the vehicle
owner's Fourth Amendment interests were implicated when police
installed the GPS device and monitored it seems defensible in light of
the historical standing inquiry because the installation and monitoring
both occurred when the vehicle was empty and parked in a public
location. Under those conditions, it is hard to envision anyone apart
from the owner whose Fourth Amendment rights were directly
implicated by the police actions at the time they occurred.
This outcome raises a plethora of scenarios in which the
government can take advantage of standing doctrine to subvert any
procedural requirements that might eventually be imposed on GPS
tracking, particularly when consent doctrine is also in play. The
beeper cases of United States v. Knott 346 and United States v. Karo3 47
provide prime examples of the important role that third-party consent
can play. In each of those cases, law enforcement placed the beepers
into containers with the consent of the owner and before the
containers came into the defendants' possession.3 * Those consents
authorized the beepers' presence and thus became crucial pillars in
the rulings against the defendants, a point Justice Scalia emphasized
in Jones.3 49
Similarly, after Jones, law enforcement has every incentive to
leverage third-party consent, such as in cases involving informants or
rental car companies, to install GPS devices onto vehicles or in
containers. As in Knotts and Karo, the third-party consent will suffice
to authorize the GPS device's presence, as Justice Scalia importantly
signaled in Jones by the way he emphasized the role of consent in
those cases. Then, a margin for error might be obtained through the
government asserting a standing challenge in an effort to further
insulate the GPS installation and use from a constitutional challenge.

345. Id. (quoting FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(e) (1956)).
346. 460 U.S. 276 (1983).
347. 468 U.S. 705 (1984).
348. Karo, 468 U.S. at 707-08; Knotts, 460 U.S. at 278.
349. See United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 952 (2012) (reviewing Karo and Knotts
and emphasizing third-party consent that law enforcement obtained in each case).
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And, in instances where third-party consent is unavailable, standing
doctrine can get the job done on its own, as Hanna demonstrates.
While Hanna is an unusual case in that the GPS device was
monitored only once and momentarily, and by sheer coincidence
when the vehicle was empty and parked, a new standing doctrine
could have sufficient teeth to have some meaningful application even
in more common scenarios. This is particularly true if Hanna's new
standing rules are accepted, as the twin factors of ownership or
exclusive use impose a high bar. What if, for example, police in
Hanna had obtained location data pertaining to one of the defendants
while he was driving? Neither defendant owned the vehicle. Even if
the defendants were frequent, authorized drivers of the vehicle
(Hanna ambiguously states only that "these Defendants were
permitted to use" the vehicle"so), none might satisfy the exclusive-use
test either given that numerous individuals would have been
authorized users, which seems anathema to exclusivity.
This outcome presumes that Hanna'sownership or exclusive-use
factors are correct, but the latter is vulnerable because it puts too
much emphasis upon Justice Scalia's use in Jones of that concept,
without acknowledging its context, in which Justice Scalia indicates
that rights amounting to those of a bailee are sufficient, and also
refers to possession. Bailee and possessory rights exist in contexts
far short of exclusive use, and thus Hanna's exclusive-use prong sets
the bar far too high and should be rejected.
F.

No Exclusionfor Violation of Warrant "Technicalities"?

In Jones, Justice Alito signaled that he is interested in continuing
to limit the exclusionary rule by embracing federal circuit
jurisprudence that draws a distinction between search warrant
violations that implicate the Fourth Amendment as opposed to other
non-constitutional sources. Under this theory, only violations that
directly implicate the Fourth Amendment lead to exclusion. Other
violations that might be termed "technical" or "procedural" because
the relevant obligation stems from a non-constitutional source do not.
As Justice Alito explained, Jones involved two search warrant
violations:

350. United States v. Hanna, No. 11-20678-CR, 2012 WL 279435, at *2 (S.D. Fla. Jan.
30,2012).
351. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 949 n.2 & 952.
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In this case, the agents obtained a warrant, but they did not
comply with two of the warrant's restrictions: They did not
install the GPS device within the 10-day period required by the
terms of the warrant and by Fed. Rule Crim. Proc.
41(e)(2)(B)(i), and they did not install the GPS device within
the District of Columbia, as required by the terms of the
warrant and by 18 U.S.C. §3117(a) and Rule 41(b)(4).352
Many federal circuits have ruled that only violations of the Fourth
Amendment itself justify exclusion, and therefore violations of nonconstitutionally imposed obligations-such as those that flow only
from the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure or statutes, for
example-do not lead to suppression.5 3 These cases are of a piece
with a larger Fourth Amendment jurisprudence that minimizes the
exclusionary rule by focusing solely on its deterrence function,354 such
as the legion of decisions that deny suppression even for defects in
particularity-which clearly implicates the Fourth Amendment-if
they are deemed minor or technical. 5 1 When governmental actors
violate obligations that Rule 41 imposes, courts avoid suppression on
the theory that Rule 41's purpose was merely to codify or implement
the Fourth Amendment's exclusionary rule; 56 it "was not intended to
create new substantive grounds for suppressing evidence." 5 7 Were
352. Id. at 964 n.11 (Alito, J., concurring); see supra note 23 and accompanying text.
353. Numerous federal circuits have denied suppression for the violation of search
warrant conditions that the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure impose. See, e.g., United
States v. Gerber, 994 F.2d 1556, 1559-60 (11th Cir. 1993); United States v. Twenty-Two
Thousand, Two Hundred Eighty Seven Dollars ($22,287.00) U.S. Currency, 709 F.2d 442,
446-49 (6th Cir. 1983); United States v. Stefanson, 648 F.2d 1231, 1235 (9th Cir. 1981);
United States v. Gitcho, 601 F.2d 369, 372 (8th Cir. 1979); United States v. Mendel, 578
F.2d 668, 673-74 (7th Cir. 1978); United States v. Burke, 517 F.2d 377, 386-87 (2d Cir.
1975). Search warrant conditions can also flow from statute, such as the federal wiretap
statute, and, similarly, their violation may or may not result in suppression. See United
States v. Chavez, 416 U.S. 562, 569-70 (1974); United States v. Giordano, 416 U.S. 505, 524
(1974); see also United States v. Lomeli, 676 F.3d 734, 739-43 (8th Cir. 2012) (concluding
that failure to identify Department of Justice authorizing official in warrant application
was a core violation of Federal Wiretap Act, which required suppression, and rejecting
argument for application of good-faith exception); United States v. Gray, 521 F.3d 514,
524-28 (6th Cir. 2008) (holding that failure to properly identify Department of Justice
authorizing official in warrant application did not require suppression).
354. See, e.g., Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 140-44 (2009); Stone v. Powell,
428 U.S. 465, 485-86 (1976); United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338,347-48 (1974).
355. See Gitcho, 601 F.2d at 371-72 (collecting cases).
356. See Cent. S.C. Chapter, Soc'y of Prof'I Journalists, Sigma Delta Chi v. U.S. Dist.
Court for the Dist. of S.C., 551 F.2d 559,564 (4th Cir. 1977).
357. United States v. Roberts, 852 F.2d 671, 673 (2d Cir. 1988). Similarly, one federal
circuit takes a "two-tiered" approach to suppression for violations of search warrant
requirements that the federal wiretap act imposes: "first identify[] the omission or defect
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this theory applied in Jones, presumably it would dispose of the case
because the Fourth Amendment certainly does not impose the
detailed ten-day temporal limit included in the warrant, and may not
impose the geographic restriction either. (At a minimum, however,
the United States would have to overcome a waiver argument in
Jones given that it never asserted this issue. 58 )
If the Supreme Court follows Justice Alito's lead and further
limits the exclusionary rule along these grounds, it will need to be
prepared to flesh out the standards that apply. For example, circuit
courts will suppress evidence even for a non-constitutional search
warrant violation if, at the time of the search, the government lacked
probable cause or acted in bad faith,5 9 or similarly where:
(1) there was "prejudice" in the sense that the search might not
have occurred or would not have been so abrasive if the rule
had been followed, or (2) there is evidence of intentional and
deliberate disregard of a provision in the Rule. 6 o
The Court would need to decide whether to endorse or reject these
standards, or impose alternatives.
CONCLUSION

Jones has historic importance if for no other reason than that
Justice Scalia's majority opinion resolves the infamous Katz
conundrum regarding whether property continues to have a pride of
place in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence after Katz introduced
privacy into the pantheon. Perhaps even more significantly, Jones has
the potential to be of even greater historical importance due to the
doctrinal clues it provides, and paths it has set out, for the future of
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, certainly in the technological
surveillance field but quite possibly more broadly as well. Jones was a
challenging case because so many disparate but often interrelating
Fourth Amendment doctrines were implicated, and the variety of
jurisprudential approaches manifested in the final Jones opinions
provide important lessons and insights about how Fourth
Amendment law will evolve.
at issue (i.e., whether the challenged document is insufficient on its face), and second,
determin[e] whether that defect violates a core statutory requirement or whether it is a
mere technical defect not warranting suppression." Lomeli, 676 F.3d at 739.
358. See United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945,964 n.11 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring).
359. See United States v. Gerber, 994 F.2d 1556, 1560 (11th Cir. 1993).
360. United States v. Stefanson, 648 F.2d 1231, 1235 (9th Cir. 1981); see also Gitcho,
601 F.2d at 372; United States v. Mendel, 578 F.2d 668, 673 (7th Cir. 1978).

78

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 91

